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Logistics Platform; and to Zoltán Vén for designing some illustrations for my articles and
for this thesis as well.
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“Every kind of peaceful cooperation among men is primarily based on mutual
trust and only secondarily on institutions such as courts of justice and police.”
Albert Einstein
In the past decades the circumstances of the industrial production have dramatically
changed. The increasing customer expectations require ever shorter delivery times, cus-
tomised products and extremely high service levels. This taut situation boosts competition
between manufacturing enterprises, which inspires them to work out new ways towards
achieving more efficient production. In parallel, the new paradigm of production networks
has emerged, which nowadays refers to cross-company relations [119]. In this introductory
chapter I briefly present the ongoing trends in manufacturing, point out why scientific
research is crucial to support the advance of new attitudes towards the exposed problems,
and I also pose some challenges for mathematics, economics and informatics, which I would
like to answer for some special but practically relevant cases in this work.
1.1 Production: Current Issues and Dilemmas
Due to today’s continuously changing market conditions, manufacturing enterprises are
facing more difficult challenges than ever before. In spite of the still existing uncertain-
ties of the environment—such as demand fluctuation, resource failures, scrap production,
procurement delays—, customer expectations are persistently growing and manufacturing
1
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must fulfil their needs to remain competitive. Nowadays, customers seldom accept short-
ages or backlogs and in addition, they often want to customise the product characteristics
themselves. The widely accepted and utilised Total Quality Management (TQM) principle
states that all expressed and unexpressed wishes of the customer should be satisfied and the
most significant manufacturers act upon this management philosophy, which phenomenon
is usually referred to as customer-oriented or demand centric attitude [55].
Naturally, there exist several paradigms to answer the current challenges all with their
own advantages and disadvantages. The craft production—whose golden age was before the
20th century—allows large variety of products, but requires complicated, time-consuming
manufacturing processes, which are also expensive. Mass production—the main paradigm
in the 20th century—achieves higher efficiency with standardised products, exploiting
economies of scale and (semi-)automated processes, but gives up the wide product scale.
In the last few decades the new paradigm of mass customisation has arisen, which tries
to combine the advantages of the previous two approaches by offering a larger variety of
products made of standardised components with mass production technology. As it has
turned out, while this new paradigm offers some solutions to some of the problems, it also
poses new questions [97, 98, 99].
The key issues can be characterised by a set of dilemmas: one has to find acceptable
trade-offs between conflicting objectives such as (i) running efficient production in large
batches or small inventory-related costs, (ii) holding more inventories or using more fre-
quent transportation, (iii) choosing the faster or the cheaper technology or transportation
alternative, (iv) offering wide variety of products or reducing product inventories, and
finally, (v) offering high service level or low prices to customers [97].
Traditional ways of improving efficiency—such as decreasing setup costs by applying
new technologies, shortening lead-times by following the so-called lean initiative, combining
push and pull supply as well as applying delayed differentiation (pushing customisation
downward1 in the supply chains)—are still important, but usually not enough. Sustaining
growth and competitiveness nowadays can be achieved only through a cooperative attitude
between enterprises as well as through the transition from factory automation to network
automation [99]. This means not only automated data exchange between enterprises, but
also increasing supply flexibility, i.e., allowing contracts with flexible order quantities [25].
1According to the standard nomenclature, downward refers to the direction towards the customers,
while upward means toward suppliers.
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One of the most subtle challenges in production networks is managing inventories ap-
propriately [69]. In the second half of the 20th century, the Just-In-Time (JIT) production
paradigm became very popular, since it promised the elimination of inventories, which
were considered passive elements of the business creating only expenses but no value [16].
However, this “zero inventory” concept could rarely be realised in practice due to its dif-
ficult introduction into existing production systems and to the high expectations of JIT
production—unvarying demand, negligible setup cost/time, and so forth. Accordingly, the
original Toyota-approach is strongly based on aggressive marketing strategies in order to
smooth the demand and avoid changes, which is the opposite of what Wal-Mart applies
and calls its “always low prices” policy [52].
Satisfying demand directly from production is often impossible, because production and
supply lead-times are much longer than the acceptable delivery times for the customers
and the stock-out situations not only cause loss of profit but also of customers [22]. In
order to provide high service levels toward end customers, inventories are essential. In
addition, the manufacturing uncertainties also have to be considered, which can originate
from three sources: (i) the internal processes (e.g., machine break down), (ii) the demand
(e.g., sudden demand increase) and (iii) the supply (e.g., late delivery) [103]. These can
again be handled by keeping buffers not only of capacities but also of materials and end-
products. The third reason for keeping inventories is to exploit economies of scale, i.e., to
divide the fixed part of the cost (e.g., setup, delivery) among more products in order to
decrease the average cost.
Although inventories and thus Make-to-Stock (MTS) production are necessary, the de-
cision about inventory levels can only be based on fluctuating and uncertain forecasts [118].
In addition, due to unforeseen changes of demand, stocks of products with short life-cycles
(e.g., customised packaging materials) may easily become obsolete, which causes not only
significant financial losses for the enterprises, but also serious waste of material, labour,
energy and environmental resources. Recently, increasing societal pressure came forward
against this kind of environmental harm and the paradigm of competitive sustainable man-
ufacturing (CSM) arose, which aims at changing technology and productivity considering
ecological and biological capacities, too [49].
Therefore it is still actual and extremely important to concentrate on inventory-related
problems; that is why it is one of the main topics also in my dissertation. Of course
MTS production is not the only possibility and the chosen approach has to match with
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the problem characteristics; there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Fig. 1.1 summarises the
most common types of the order fulfilment. It is necessary to study the market conditions,
differentiate products according to the demand volume, variety, variability and choose the
appropriate answer for the given situation, which results typically in a hybrid approach
[23]. However, in this work I concentrate chiefly on customised components with uncertain

























Figure 1.1: Make-to-Stock and Make-to-Order approaches (Source: [3] p. 95.).
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1.2 Cooperation in Production Networks
Consumer goods are mainly produced in a long process of multiple steps, which are often
carried out by separate, autonomous and rational production enterprises, linked by supply
chains. Since the uncertainty is amplified due to safety stocks as we traverse upwards the
chains (the so-called bullwhip effect [59]), decentralisation leads to suboptimal overall sys-
tem performance called double marginalisation, which can be interpreted as the symptom
of the prisoners’ dilemma in supply chains [105].
Hence, in production networks inventory management is even more problematic than
in the centralised case. As previous studies have shown (see Chapter 2), the resultant of
the locally optimal decisions usually leads to suboptimal network performance, since the
objectives of the autonomous decision makers are not aligned with any global objective [1].
A network-wide solution emerges from the interaction of local decisions. This is essentially
a distributed planning problem: network members would like to exercise control over some
future events based on information what they know at the moment for certain (about
products, technologies, resource capabilities, sales histories) and only anticipate (demand,
resource and material availability).
The theoretical solution to this problem is to appoint a central decision maker, whom
every participant has to share all relevant information. The resulted planning task is
rather complex in itself, since the information about the future is still uncertain, and in
addition, different, conflicting objectives (e.g., service level and operation efficiency) should
be considered. However, this centralised coordination approach is practically unrealisable.
Several intermediate settings are also conceivable between the two extremes of the com-
pletely distributed and centralised planning. Pibernik and Sucky call these approaches as
partially centralised coordination and they also introduce a measure for centralisation [82].
This is a general model of describing stages of cooperation; their paper regards only the
master planning task, though. These different cooperation stages can also be illustrated in
a range of colours from cold blue to hot red [35]. In a real production network several types
of relationships are combined in order to appropriately face the challenges of the different
market characteristics [120].
The currently accepted direction for resolving the problems points towards extended
coordination and cooperation along the supply chains, thus the paradigm of production
in networks has emerged [119]. This is especially true for the case of customised com-
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ponents, since they cannot be procured with auctions on the short-term—which is usual
on matching markets. Instead, mass customisation necessitates long-term strategic part-
nerships, clear regulation of responsibilities and vertically integrated supply chains. It is
widely accepted that tight cooperation also results in more efficient production, facilitates
technology sharing and helps mutual growth [65].
Several practical initiatives have taken this approach, like the Vendor Managed Inven-
tory (VMI), the Quick Response (QR), the Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) or the
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) programme, to name a
few examples. In this dissertation I consider the VMI business model, where the supplier
takes full responsibility of managing the one-point inventory so that the customer does not
have to possess component buffers at all [97]. However, the main reason for applying VMI
in the practice is the market power of the customer, and not the mutual interest.
The theory of contracting aims at supporting the cooperation and developing arrange-
ments for aligning the different objectives of the partners. Contracts are protocols that
control the flows of information, materials (or service) and financial assets alike. In general,
a contracting scheme should consist of the following components [63]:
i.) local planning methods which consider the constraints and objectives of the individual
partners,
ii.) an infrastructure and protocol for information sharing, and
iii.) an incentive scheme for aligning the individual interests of the partners.
The appropriate planning methods are necessary for optimising the behaviour of the
production network. The second component should support the information visibility and
transparency both within and among the partners and facilitates the realisation of real-
time enterprises. Information is often uncertain, but if it is further distorted or delayed, it
corresponds to a car whose control panel indicates always a few days earlier fuel level [72].
Finally, the third component should guarantee that the partners act upon to the common
goals of the network.
A contract is said to achieve channel coordination, if thereby the partners’ optimal local
decisions lead to optimal system-wide performance. My present work deals with these three
issues of operating cooperative production networks.
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1.3 Motivation
The industrial motivation of this work comes from a large-scale national industry-academia
RTD project aimed at realising real-time, cooperative enterprises [74, 75]. The participating
industrial partners form a complete focal network: a central assembly plant with several
external and internal suppliers. The assembler produces altogether several million units
of low-tech consumer goods per week from a mix of thousands of products. The ratio of
the customised products follows the 80/20 Pareto-principle: they give 80% of the product
spectrum, but only 20% of the volume. The setup costs are significant and since customised
products are consumed slower, their smaller lot-sizes involve higher average setup costs.
Service level requirements are extremely high: some retailers suddenly demand the delivery
of products in large quantities, even within 24 hours, and if the request is not fulfilled on
time, they cancel the order (i.e., backlogs are not allowed). This causes not only lost
sales, but also decrease of goodwill and perhaps lost customers. In order to deal with
the uncertainty efficiently, cooperative attitude is present in the network whereupon my
models are built.
Due to the strong industrial background of my research, my goal was also to bridge the
gap between theory and practice. I intended to develop precise mathematical models and
information technology infrastructure considering conditions in real production networks,
together with such efficient algorithms that support decision making and help estimating
the possible consequences of the decisions. I considered the criteria of realisability and
applicability all along my work, but at the same time I did not give up the exact and solid
mathematical principles. All in all, the models should capture
i.) market uncertainty,
ii.) local decision-making at enterprises,
iii.) information asymmetry,
iv.) long-term relations and planning horizon,
v.) integrability with existing information systems and
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vi.) simplicity of models and solutions (as far as possible)2.
In addition, in my models I assume rational, risk neutral—expected value maximiser—
decision makers. Such behaviour can be expected from decision support systems, but
human decision makers rarely act upon this “ideal” approach. Considering bounded ratio-
nality and risk aversion is therefore a possible further research direction in this field.
As it turned out, the developed models and applied concepts can be used in other
industrial sectors, too. My research is continuing with a network situated in the automo-
tive industry which aims at shifting toward a customise-to-order approach. Although it
basically differs from the consumer goods industry, the fundamental goals and problems
are surprisingly similar. Furthermore, such circumstances are being reported also from
other industrial fields—like pharmaceutical and high-tech—including increased variety of
products, strict standards, high quality requirements and short product life-cycles.
My work therefore fits into the series of Hungarian research in frames of the National
Research and Development Projects (NKFP), such as Digital Factories and VITAL; as well
as to the EU’s Framework Programmes (FP) for Research and Technological Development.
1.4 Organisation of the Dissertation
In accordance with the introductory problem statement, I compiled a roadmap to coop-
erative planning that I followed throughout my research, see Fig. 1.2. The first phase is
creating an organisational model of the networked enterprises, which can be used for iden-
tifying and stating the operational problems and which serves as a basis for the further
work. The second phase is the design of specific planning algorithms, cooperation mecha-
nisms and information sharing concept models; and finally, the developed algorithms can
be implemented into real applications. In this work, I concentrate chiefly on the second
phase, which requires a formal modelling and problem solving approach.
This thesis is organised into four further chapters. In Chapter 2, I overview the state-
of-the-art in the three different fields related to my research: enterprise and supply chain
modelling, lot-sizing, and channel coordination. Chapter 3 introduces novel extensions
2Similarly to the Ockham’s razor principle. Simplicity is especially important for small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) that are unable to apply complex solutions.


































Figure 1.2: Roadmap to cooperative planning.
and solutions of two classical lot-sizing models, namely the newsvendor and the Wagner –
Whitin. Chapter 4 studies the previous models in a decentralised setting and presents
such compensation contracts that provide channel coordination. Finally, in Chapter 5, I
shortly demonstrate some implemented software applications for illustrating the results of
my research.
Throughout the thesis I present some numerical examples that were partially derived
from real industrial historical data in order to test how the proposed algorithms could
perform in practical situations. Other simulations were based on large amount of random
data, which give more insights into the general properties of the described solutions.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter after a general introduction to supply chain management, I briefly overview
two fields related to my dissertation: the centralised inventory management models and
the coordination models for decentralised supply chains.
2.1 Supply Chain Management and Advanced Plan-
ning Systems
Manufacturing systems modelling research has proposed several business process modelling
methodologies and tools over the last few decades [114]. The most common, so-called
semi-formal techniques integrate easily understandable graphical representations with for-
mal theoretical background. Beyond the models designed specifically for manufactur-
ing systems—e.g., CIMOSA, IDEF3, ARIS—the UML notation originated from object-
oriented software technology is also widely used for enterprise modelling purposes. Nowa-
days, the state-of-the-art approach is the Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN),
which is aimed at being a common understanding for all stakeholders and bridging the
communication gap between process design and implementation [115]. BPMN is defined
by the Object Management Group (OMG)—the same consortium which is responsible for
the UML and CORBA standards among others.
In production networks every enterprise has basically similar tasks, although they dif-
fer in the inner organisational structure, processes, complexity, dimensions and realisa-
tion. When two enterprises are linked by a supply chain—and in absence of centralised
10
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coordination and lateral connections this is the dominant link—, they join the correspond-
ing processes with each other. In this way, a tiern company is linked only with tiern+1
(supplier) and tiern−1 (customer) enterprises, thus every inter-enterprise relationship is bi-
lateral, which is easy to implement and control. In this case, also the cooperation can
be only bilateral and the operation of the whole network emerges from these cooperative
agreements.
In order to extend the process modelling to the network level, the Supply-Chain Council
has developed the Supply-Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model, which provides a
unique framework for linking business processes, performance metrics, best practices and
technology features into a unified structure [92]. The SCOR model consists of a chain
of companies, each having two parallel, opposite flows of goods: the source-make-deliver
manufacturing and the return reverse logistics flows. Behind these functions, there is a
complex planning process which controls these flows, see Fig. 2.1.














Figure 2.1: Processes of the SCOR model. (Source: [92] p. 3.)
Based on the SCOR model, several reference models have been proposed to unfold the
details of the planning process. One of these is the planning matrix, which decomposes the
planning functions into the commonly used software modules of the so-called the Advanced
Planning Systems (APS) [50, 100]. This model—like complex artificial and natural systems
often—builds up a hierarchical structure in order to be able to deal with the complexity
of problems efficiently. For an analogy, consider the human brain, where the temporal
perception and cognitive control tasks compose five different levels: strategic, segmented
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tactical, maneuver, short-term integration and synchronisation levels [104]. Each level dif-
fers in its temporal frame (granularity) and horizon. They are linked by a feedback-control
cycle which defines the relationship between the subproblems. Like the human brain, such
models can be regarded pluralistic systems with several different, often redundant or even
inconsistent views of the very same environment, which also apply different “algorithms”.
The right choice of the appropriate submodel depends on the actual task to be solved.
In the planning matrix the hierarchy is separated into three proactive planning levels:
strategic (long-term), tactical (mid-term) and operational (short-term), see Fig. 2.2. Note
that this is a hierarchy of tasks and independent from the organisation structure (e.g.,
pyramidal, network). To continue the analogy, the hierarchy of human cognitive tasks
does not imply any hierarchy of the individual neurons.
Strategic Network Planning






















Figure 2.2: Planning matrix1. (Source: [100] p. 579.)
The horizon of the strategic level usually covers several years. The goal here is to
design the network on the long term, which involves decisions about core competencies,
choosing from available suppliers (or sometimes even from customers) and adjust capacities
to the planned yield. Since the problem in this level is too complex to be completely
modelled and the decisions have consequences in the long run, it is generally supervised
by human experts. During the planning process, several possible frame plan scenarios
are generated and evaluated both with the help of decision support systems and with
1ATP is the abbreviation of Available-to-Promise.
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negotiations between enterprises. On the tactical level the objective is to plan cost efficient
production on a medium term—approximately one year—with one week as the time unit.
This level should create demand forecasts for the horizon and make corresponding plans
for the yield, production, capacity usage, inventories, supply and distribution. On the
operational level the main goal is to realise the medium-term plans. The horizon here
is only few weeks long, the planning cycle is daily and the granularity of plans are often
less than an hour, but maximum one day. This level should plan the demand fulfilment,
transportation, schedule production and ensure necessary materials. Moreover, the delivery
of components and products should be planned often in JIT manner. In order to adapt to
changing circumstances, the planning tasks on these two latter levels should be performed
on a rolling horizon basis, i.e., cyclically the previous plans have to be revised and modified
according the to current situation.
The feedback mechanism in the brain is functioning well—even though we do not fully
understand it—, but in enterprises the relationships between these levels are often ill-
defined and sometimes completely disregarded. Inappropriate communication between
planning tasks can lead to suboptimal efficiency in an enterprise, let alone in the whole
network. A common example is when the sourcing department on the strategic level regards
only the unit price and chooses suppliers with the lowest bids. On tactical and operational
levels however, this can cause enormous inventories and logistic costs. Another typical
case is when inconsequential models of production planning and scheduling are applied,
which lead to either infeasible problems or idle capacities on the operational level [112]. In
order to manage these issues, it is not enough to focus on independent planning functions
(structural view), but they should be regarded as coherent processes (dynamic view) [126].
A recently popular and promising approach for modelling complex systems is the mul-
tiagent technology offering (i) a design metaphor, (ii) technologies for handling interactions
and (iii) simulation tools alike [68]. The field of multiagent systems originated from the
artificial intelligence research, but while the latter is interested in the behaviour of an
intelligent artifact, multiagent systems deal with the emergent behaviour of a society con-
sisting of intelligent agents. An advantage of this approach is that it can include results of
a number of other disciplines, e.g., distributed systems, artificial intelligence, game theory
and social sciences. Accordingly, it offers several approaches for cooperative distributed
problem solving—such as the Contract Net Protocol—but unfortunately most of these so-
lutions assume benevolence, i.e., the agents must implicitly share a common goal, which
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often does not hold in the reality [122].
Agents provide a natural metaphor in many complex environments, such as the man-
ufacturing and the supply chains [76, 77]. Although multiagent systems are usually less
efficient compared to centralised solutions, they are more flexible, easier to understand and
implement. In addition, in certain settings centralised approaches are impossible. By now,
there is a common understanding that various requirements of networked manufacturing
can really be met by autonomous, embodied, communicative and eventually cooperative
agents.
Still, the number of deployed multiagent systems that are already running in real indus-
trial environments is surprisingly small. According to a survey made in 2006, even in the
“ideal” field of supply chain management, only half a dozen deployed applications could be
found that were in everyday use [76]. An important reason for this is that in the behaviour
of a multiagent system there is always an element of emergence which can be a serious bar-
rier to the practical acceptance of agent-based solutions. Industry needs safeguards against
unpredictable behaviour and guarantees regarding reliability and operational performance.
However, the agent metaphor is useful not only for system design, but also for simulation
with at least three different purposes: (i) simulation for decision making, (ii) simulation
for evaluating planning technologies and (iii) simulation for education [88].
2.2 Lot-Sizing
While the golden age of inventory research was in the 1950s, the recently changed market
conditions have induced paradigm change and the need for new models [16]. In order to re-
main competitive on global markets, today’s production must be customer-oriented, which
means that customer demand must be satisfied at high service level with short lead-times.
These main requirements—which are specified by the long-term strategic management—
must be achieved on lower levels by the tactical and operational management, which need
new models and tools for optimisation [24].
As it was previously mentioned, production is typically based on uncertain finished good
forecast, which can be prepared using several statistical methods [45] and therefore the
demand uncertainty can be expressed in terms of standard deviation. Unfortunately, this
information is usually distorted by human factors [37]. In addition, when the production is
planned in the medium term, the uncertainty of information disappears or is transformed
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to safety stock margins, because most practical planning systems cannot handle stochastic
problems. The result of the planning process is a discrete plan of production quantities,
respecting the capacity and technological constraints. This is also regarded as the basis
of the dependent “component consumption forecast” and the economic purchase plan can
be determined from this component forecast using appropriate lot-sizing methods. This
metamorphosis of demand-related information is illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The transformation of demand-related information.
The general inventory planning problem can be briefly characterised in the following
way: the demand is given in a medium-term planning horizon with an uncertain demand
and the production (or procurement) should be planned in such a way which satisfies
the demand—with a prescribed service level—and involves minimal total cost. The total
cost in standard models can include (i) fixed (setup or ordering) cost, (ii) unit price, (iii)
inventory holding cost and (iv) shortage penalty. I extended this list with (v) the cost of
obsolete inventory, see Chapter 3 for further details.
The lot-sizing models can be classified according to the following criteria [85]:
Location2. From this viewpoint single- and multi-location models exist. The latter type
includes also transportation planning, which results in a more complex problem.
Level. Single-level models disregard product structure, while multi-level variants include
this structure, therefore raw product3 (RPI), work-in-progress (WIP) and finished
goods (FGI) inventories are considered alike. These problems are usually handled
with Material Requirements Planning/Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP/MRP
II) methods in practical situations, which often apply some single-level lot-sizing al-
gorithm at each level.
2In [85] “facility” is used instead.
3According to the nomenclature, RPI is used for component inventory.
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Item. Single-item models focus on the decision about one specific product without consid-
ering the relationship among different products. Multi-item models however, study
these relations, e.g., joint setup costs or required common capacitated resources.
Capacity. Uncapacitated models assume that all resources are available without limits,
while capacitated models consider limited resource (or sometimes inventory) capaci-
ties .
Demand. Demand can be classified along two dimensions. One one hand, it can be
deterministic or stochastic. While in most real situations demand is uncertain, thus
considering stochastic demand is closer to the reality, these models are too complex,
therefore they are usually transformed into approximate deterministic problems4. On
the other hand, demand can have static or dynamic nature, which expresses that the
demand quantity is considered to be constant or can be different from time to time.
In addition, models can be differentiated according to further characteristics, such as
length of the horizon, backlogging or lead-time properties. The detailed description of the
models reviewed below—if no other reference is indicated—can be found in [5, 45, 58, 121].
2.2.1 Classical Static Models
One of the first papers about mathematical approaches of lot-sizing introduced the famous
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model [42]. This model assumes deterministic static
demand on infinite horizon, which should be satisfied without backlogs, uncapacitated
resources and zero lead-time. Two types of costs are considered: the fixed and the unit
holding cost. Like in all models without lost sales, due to the fact that all demand should
be satisfied, the production cost is constant independently of decision variables, thus can be
omitted from the objective function. The optimal trade-off between the fixed and holding
costs is given by the EOQ square root formula. Based on this simple model, several variants
have been developed by relaxing some assumptions, e.g., considering continuous instead of
instantaneous production results in the Economic Production Lot (EPL) model.
The widely studied newsvendor model omits the assumption of deterministic demand
and considers the stochastic problem in one period. In this case, the planner has to
4Theoretically, other approaches for modelling uncertainty—e.g., fuzzy sets—are also conceivable.
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determine the lot-size before the demand would be realised. The decision can be based
only on a forecast, thus either shortage or excess may occur and both incur a cost that
is proportional to the deviation from the lot-size. The linear cost for the shortage is
usually explained with loss of goodwill, with penalty engagement or with a more expensive
production mode (e.g., overtime, outsourcing). In this case, the optimal lot-size can be
expressed using the inverse of the cumulative density function (CDF) of the demand,
therefore strictly monotonically increasing CDF yields a unique optimum. Most papers
assume the normal distribution—which choice is reasoned with the central limit theorem—,
in spite of its drawbacks: even negative demands have some probability and it forces the
probability density function (PDF) to be symmetric [101]. Thus in extreme cases, also
negative lot-sizes can be resulted as optimal.
When no fixed cost is involved, it is not rational to apply large lots instead of one-
at-a-time fashion production or procurement. This situation is handled by the base stock
model, which includes stochastic demand and fixed lead-time. The solution of the model
determines an optimal base stock level respecting a specified service level (usually an upper
bound on the probability of shortage). The base stock inventory handling policy states
that the on-hand inventory plus the open order minus the backlogs should be equal to the
base stock level.
When fixed cost is included to the base stock model, we get the (Q, r) model, where Q
is the lot-size and r is the reorder point : when the inventory level decreases to r, quantity
Q should be produced or ordered. The advantage of this model is that the lot-size is
constant, but it requires, that the demand occurs in one-at-a-time fashion—otherwise the
inventory level may not be equal to r. A variant of this approach is the (s, S) model, which
solves this problem: it proposes that when the inventory level reaches or goes below s, it
should be filled up to S (order-up-to-level). These two models assume continuous review,
i.e., products can be ordered at any time point. When this does not apply and orders can
be given only periodically in specific time points—e.g., once per month—then the (R, S)
periodic review policy can be used, which means that in every R time interval the inventory
should be filled up to level S.
A variant of the problem raised by the economics of shortage assumes uncertain supply
and focuses on the task of determining the optimal safety stock level; this became known
as the Hungarian inventory control model [83].
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2.2.2 Classical Dynamic Models
The basic model and solution of the deterministic dynamic lot-sizing was published in 1958
by Wagner and Whitin [116]. In their paper, a finite, discrete horizon is assumed and the
demand is given in each period of the horizon. To minimise the total cost consisting of
inventory holding and fixed setup costs, the planned lot-size should be determined for each
period, which can be done with a backward induction algorithm in O(n2) time (where n
is the length of the horizon). When the method was invented, that time complexity was
considered too high for practical applications, therefore several heuristics were developed—
e.g., the Silver – Meal approach [95]—, which are frequently used in MRP systems. Much
later, in the early 1990s, three groups of researchers proved independently that this problem
can be solved in O(n) (even the generalisation of the model in O(n ln n)) time; further
discussion and references can be found for example in [5].
The deterministic lot-sizing problem also has several extensions and variants. For ex-
ample, Zangwill studies the situation when backlogs—negative inventories—are allowed,
where the inventory holding and the shortage costs are combined into a piecewise concave
inventory cost [127]. This model can be solved also with a dynamic programming algo-
rithm, and in case of linear production cost, its time complexity is only the double of the
no backlogging case’s.
The more realistic versions of the deterministic lot-sizing problems including e.g., capac-
ity constraints and sequence-dependent setups are usually NP-hard, thus exact solutions
of such problems—even with efficient specialised algorithms—are usually applicable only
on relatively small instances, but not in industrial sizes [4, 54]. Therefore numerous ap-
proximation algorithms and heuristics are applied to provide quasi-optimal solutions or to
consider practically important special cases [47].
The basic dynamic model for the stochastic case was developed in 1959 by Herbert Scarf
[91]. The solution of this model applies a stochastic dynamic programming formulation
for determining (st, St) reorder points and order-up-to levels for each period t on the
horizon. Scarf pointed out that the recursive formulation of the expected total cost satisfies
the so-called K-convexity property, and this can be used to prove the optimality of the
solution. However, the existing algorithms for determining (st, St) levels are complex and
time consuming.
Since the stochastic problem is hard to solve and the component forecasts usually come
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from production planning system which are unable to handle stochastic problems, almost
always deterministic demand is considered in practical applications. In order to deal with
uncertainty, the following approaches can be used:
Safety buffers. The stochastic demand can be turned into a deterministic one by con-
sidering its expected value plus a safety stock based on the standard deviation. Fur-
thermore, safety capacities and safety lead-times are also frequently applied.
Rolling horizon planning. Demand forecasts are generated periodically in such a way
that two consecutive forecasts of length n are overlapping in n − 1 periods. In the
overlapping period, the newer forecast updates the values of the previous forecast
based on more recent information.
Time fences. Time fences constrain (or define) the flexibility of the demand in particular
intervals of the horizon [45]. One widely used variant of this concept is called frozen
period, which fixes the demand for the first few periods, thus it cannot be modified
later.
Combining these approaches provides useful heuristics for handling dynamic lot-sizing
problems. However, choosing parameters for these models—such as length of the hori-
zon [113] and length of the frozen period [64]—greatly affects the approximation of the
optimal solution.
Recently, on markets of customised mass products, the short life-cycle of the prod-
ucts also had to be considered. One of the few papers studying this problem is [51],
which extends Scarf’s (st, St) model with stochastic product life-cycle, transforms it into
a deterministic form and solves the resulted problem approximately with a modified Wag-
ner – Whitin algorithm. This is akin to my approach described in Section 3, where also
some important differences between the two models will be shown.
The models reviewed above consider only the problem of managing inventory at only
one location5. The seminal paper of Clark and Scarf extended Scarf’s original (st, St)
model to the cases of sequential supply chains and tree-shaped networks [20]. In spite of
some strict assumptions of this model justified by the original military background of the
research—such as a central planner of the network and lack of fixed setup cost at all but
5In [127] a deterministic multi-echelon model is also described, but it was published after the Clark and
Scarf paper.
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the lowest level—it prompted the modern inventory theory of supply chain management.
Several channel coordination papers presented in the next section are clearly influenced by
this multi-echelon inventory model.
2.3 Channel Coordination
In order to demonstrate the problem of decentralised planning, I present a simple example
here based on [94]. Let us consider a supply chain with one supplier and one customer
serving a market with uncertain demand for the end-product. The customer creates a
demand forecast (the density function) and then orders components from the supplier.
The profit of the supplier becomes linear in the order quantity, consisting of the difference
between the wholesale price and the production cost:
supplier’s profit = (wholesale price - production cost) * order quantity.
On the other hand, the profit function of the customer is more complex: ordering too
much results in obsolete inventory, which can have some salvage value (even negative).
Thus the customer’s profit can be expressed in the following way:
customer’s profit = Min(order quantity, demand) * retail price
+ Max(order quantity - demand, 0) * salvage value
- order quantity * wholesale price.
Since the demand is stochastic, the customer wants to maximise its expected profit.
Fig. 2.4 shows the profits of both parties—with some definite parameters—as well as their
sum, i.e., total supply chain profit. Note that this latter is independent from the wholesale
price.
As the figure shows, the customer’s optimal order quantity is 700, which yields e 42,080
profit on the customer’s and e 59,500 on the supplier’s side, i.e., totally e 101,580. How-
ever, ordering 900 would result in e 112,770 total profit, which is e 11,190 more than in
the previous case, clearly not the optimal decision for the customer, though.
The goal of channel coordination is to achieve the optimal efficiency on the supply
chain level—e.g., by inspiring the customer with discounts to increase order quantity—, so
thus the extra profit can be shared between the partners. This can be possible, because as

















Figure 2.4: Example for suboptimal channel performance. (Source: [94])
we have seen, the total supply chain profit is independent from the wholesale price which
modifies only the individual profit functions.
In the above example all parameters were considered to be common knowledge, there-
fore both partners can compute the expected profits, optimal order sizes and share the
surplus fairly. In real situations this is usually not true; some parameters (e.g., the pro-
duction cost or the demand forecast) are private information of the partners, which makes
the coordination problem much more difficult. In such cases there is an information asym-
metry which can be resolved by information sharing, but the partners can have incentives
to share untruthful information in order to maximise their profits. Although channel co-
ordination is achievable also in these cases with special contracts, they usually cannot
guarantee arbitrary profit sharing.
The general method for studying coordination mechanisms consists of two steps. At
first, one assumes a central decision maker with complete information who solves the prob-
lem. The result is a so-called first-best solution which provides bound on the obtainable
system-wide performance objective. In the second step one regards the decentralised prob-
lem and designs such a contract protocol that approaches or even achieves the performance
of the first-best solution.
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2.3.1 Classification of the Models
An early review of supply chain contracts can be found in [107]. In this paper supply chain
management is defined as the extension of the classic multi-echelon inventory theory with
the ideas of decentralisation (multiple decision makers), asymmetric information and new
manufacturing and logistic paradigms, such as delayed differentiation and outsourcing. The
study also provides a taxonomy for classifying contracts, which consists of eight different
contract types. The authors pointed out however, that these classes are not disjoint. An-
other classification can be found in [66], where the different contract types are categorised
according to the leader, i.e., the partner, who designs them. This taxonomy does also not
define disjoint classes. Therefore I present below a set of aspects which generalises these
taxonomies by allowing classification along multiple viewpoints. This approach resembles
the scheme presented in [12], albeit that review focuses on models where the market price
is a decision variable, I consider exogenous prices instead. The different viewpoints can be
defined as follows:
Horizon. Most of the related models consider either one-period horizon or two-period
horizon with forecast update. In the latter, the production can be based on the
preliminary forecast with normal production mode or on the updated forecast with
emergency production, which means shorter lead-time, but higher cost. These models
are extensively discussed e.g., in [93]. In addition, the horizon can consist of multiple
periods and it can be even infinite.
Number of products. Almost all models regard only one product. Handling more prod-
ucts in gross is necessary in case of technological or financial constraints, like capacity
or budget limits.
Demand characteristic. Generally, the demand is considered stochastic, although some
models assume deterministic demand.
Risk treatment. In most of the models the players are regarded to be risk neutral. This
means that they intend to maximise their expected profit (or minimise their expected
costs). However, some studies regard risk averse players who want to find an accept-
able trade-off considering both the expected value and the variance of the profit.
Risk aversion is widely applied in the financial researches.
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Shortage treatment. The models differ in their attitude towards stockouts. Most au-
thors consider either backlogs, when the demand must be fulfilled later at the expense
of providing lower price or lost sales which also includes some theoretical costs (e.g.,
loss of goodwill, loss of profit, etc.). Some models include a service level constraint,
which limits the occurrence or quantity of expected stockouts. Even the 100% ser-
vice level can be achieved with additional or emergency production (e.g., overtime,
outsourcing) for higher costs.
Parameters and variables. This viewpoint shows the largest variations in the different
models. The main decision variable is quantity-related (production quantity, order
quantity, number of options, etc.), but sometimes prices are also decision variables.
The parameters can be either constant or stochastic. The most common parameters
are related to costs: fixed (ordering or setup) cost, production cost and inventory
holding cost. These are optional; many models disregard fixed or inventory holding
costs. There exist numerous other parameters: prices for the different contracts (see
details later), salvage value, shortage penalty, lead-time, etc.
Basic model. Most of the one-period models apply the newsvendor model. On two-period
horizon, this is extended with the possibility of two production modes. On a multiple
period horizon the base-stock, or in case of deterministic demand the EOQ models
are the most widespread.
Technological constraints. Generally, technological constraints are completely disre-
garded in the coordination literature. However, in real industrial cases resource
capacity, inventory or budget constraints can be relevant.
Solution technique. In the basic models—and most papers study these—the optimum of
the objective function can be determined with simple algebraic operations. However,
in case of more complex models and further constraints, more powerful solution
techniques may be required, like mathematical programming, dynamic programming,
constraint programming, and, in the last resort, heuristics or metaheuristics.
Number of players. We focus on the two-player case and call the players supplier and
customer. There are also extensions of this simple model: the multiple customers with
correlated demand and the multiple suppliers with different production parameters.
Multi-echelon extensions are also conceivable, however, sparse in the literature.
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Information structure. Some papers study the symmetric information case, when all
of the players know exactly the same parameters. This approach is very convenient
for cost sharing, since all players know the incurring system cost. The asymmetric
case, when there is an information gap between the players is more realistic, but
poses new challenges. The asymmetry typically concerns either the cost parameters
or the demand forecast. The demand and the forecast are usually considered to be
qualitative, limited to only two possible values: high and low. Some papers also
study the cost of information sharing, but this problem has decreasing importance
nowadays, thanks to the widespread electronic data interchange solutions.
Decision structure. The decision making roles of the players depend on the specified de-
cision variables. However, there is a more-or-less general classification in this aspect:
forced and voluntary compliance. Under forced compliance the supplier is responsible
for satisfying all orders of the customer, therefore he6 does not have the opportunity
to decide about the production quantity. Under voluntary compliance, the supplier
decides about the production quantity and he cannot be forced to fill an order. This
latter is more complex analytically, but I agree with the conclusion of [8]: “[. . . ]
forced compliance violates the original premise for studying supply chain contract-
ing: that no one firm controls all supply chain actions. [. . . ] Firm commitments are
undesirable because they restrict the system’s ability to respond to evolving infor-
mation.” Even so, several papers assume that the supplier decides about the price
and then the customer decides the order quantity.
Game theoretic model. From this point of view the models can take cooperative or
non-cooperative approaches [57, 87, 105]. The cooperative approach studies, how the
players form coalitions therefore these models are usually applied on the strategic level
of network design. Other typical form of cooperative games involves some bargaining
framework, e.g., the Nash bargaining model. The non-cooperative approaches usually
apply the sequential Stackelberg game model, where one of the players, the leader
moves first and then the follower reacts. Both cases—the supplier or the customer
as the Stackelberg leader—are widely studied in the literature. In case of information
asymmetry, a similar sequential model is used and it is called principal – agent setting.
6According to the widespread notation in the literature, I refer customer as she and the supplier as he.
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The study of the long-term supply relationship as a repeated game is a promising new
research field [84].
Contract type. This aspect also provides many possibilities, some widespread variations
are briefly described below. Besides, there exist several combinations and customised
approaches, too.
Two-part tariff. In this case the customer pays not only for the purchased goods,
but in addition a fixed amount called franchise fee per order. This is intended
to compensate the supplier for his fixed setup cost.
Sales rebate. This contract specifies two prices and a quantity threshold. If the
order size is below the threshold, the customer pays the higher price, and if it
is above, she pays a lower price for the units above the threshold.
Quantity discount. This resembles to the sales rebate contract, but there is no
threshold defined, but the customer pays a wholesale price inversely proportional
to the order quantity.
Buyback/return. With these types of contracts the supplier offers that he will buy
back the remaining obsolete inventory at a discounted price. This supports the
sharing of inventory risk between the partners. A variation of this contract is
the backup agreement, where the customer gives a preliminary forecast and then
makes an order less or equal to the forecasted quantity. If the order is less,
she must also pay a proportional penalty for the remaining obsolete inventory.
Buyback agreements are widespread in the newspaper, book, CD and fashion
industries.
Quantity flexibility. In this case the customer gives a preliminary forecast and
then she can give fixed order in an interval around the forecast. Such contracts
are widespread in several markets, e.g., among the suppliers of the European
automotive industry.
Revenue sharing. With revenue sharing the customer pays not only for the pur-
chased goods, but also shares a given percentage of her revenue with the supplier.
This contract is successfully used in video cassette rental and movie exhibition
fields. It can be proved, that the optimal revenue sharing and buyback contracts
are equivalent, i.e., they generate the same profits for the partners.
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Options. The options contracts are originated from the product and stock exchange.
With options contract, the customer can give fixed orders in advance, as well as
buy rights to purchase more (call option) or return (put option) products later.
The options can be bought at a predefined option price and executed at the
execution price. This approach is a generalisation of some previous contracts.
In Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6 the above aspects are presented in a structured way.
2.3.2 One- and Two-Period Models
An extensive discussion of the coordination contracts can be found in [9]. This review
mostly focuses on the newsvendor model, but several extensions of the basic problem are
also considered. Another, more general and recent survey can be found in [63]. In the
following two subsections—which are divided along the information structure—I overview
some previous works related to my research, in order of their appearance.
Models with Symmetric Information Structure
Barnes-Schuster et al. [2] study a two-period model with forecast update. The authors
propose an option model and show that it is a generalisation of the most common co-
ordination contracts. The demand can always be satisfied with emergency production,
therefore no shortage occurs at the supplier’s side. On the customer’s side however, if her
order and executed options do not cover the demand, she has to pay penalty. There are
several differences between this work and my model: Barnes-Schuster et al. disregard fixed
costs and information asymmetry, and in addition, their model assumes that the customer
limits the flexibility of the supply chain with the orders and options.
Cheng et al. [15] study a one-period newsvendor problem and propose a Stackelberg
game with option contracts. In their model, the supplier is the Stackelberg leader who
decides about prices, then customer orders and buys options before the selling period.
Only one production mode is considered and the compliance is forced: the supplier must
produce all quantity for satisfying firm orders and bought options.
Cachon [10] studies a one-period newsvendor model, where the production must be
realised before the selling period due to the long lead-times. The paper compares two
different contracts: push and pull. In the former, the customer submits a “prebook order”
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Figure 2.5: Overview of common aspects of coordination models.
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Figure 2.6: Overview of aspects of decentralised coordination models.
and the supplier must fulfil it. In the latter, the supplier must produce before getting
any order and the customer submits an “at-once order” only at the beginning of the
selling period. In fact, Cachon proposes a combination of these approaches: the advance-
purchase discount contract. Here the customer submits both prebook and at-once order,
but this latter with a higher wholesale price. It is shown that this contract achieves channel
coordination, and by adjusting the two wholesale prices the overall profit can be arbitrary
allocated. The main disadvantage of the model (pointed out by the author) is the lack of
fixed cost. If an additional shipment cost is introduced for the at-once order, the combined
contract no longer coordinates the channel.
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Wang et al. [117] analyse the decisions of a supplier and a customer whether or not to
join a business-to-business (B2B) e-market with annual subscription and per unit trans-
action fees. They consider markets with long lead-times, therefore the customer has to
order in advance which can cause either obsolete inventory or lost sales. The authors
study the benefits of using a return policy, which is shown to be appropriate for coordi-
nating the channel and under reasonable conditions it performs better on e-markets than
on traditional ones.
Lee and Chu [61] present the most common practical business relations, where the
supplier is responsible for the inventory handling. They formulate models for both the
traditional and the new business relations based on the newsvendor problem and they also
extend the model with service level guarantee. The authors derive necessary and sufficient
conditions, under which it is worth changing the traditional business model to the new one
for both players. However, they do not determine optimal supply chain performance and
thus they do not study channel coordination.
Liu et al. [67] study a two-period problem, where the supplier decides the prices and the
customer generates orders. The paper proposes a combined contract with two wholesale
prices and buyback policy and shows, that this can coordinate the channel and can allocate
supply chain profit arbitrarily. This study also disregards fixed cost and allows shortages.
Koulamas [53] considers the revenue sharing contract and models it with a Stackelberg
game, where the supplier defines the price. In the revenue sharing contract, the customer
orders for a unit price and also shares a percentage of the realised profit after the sales.
This contract is proved to coordinate the channel and strictly increases the expected profit
of the customer. The author also derives conditions which guarantee that the expected
profit of the supplier will not decrease.
Chen et al. [14] also study a two-period problem, where the supplier decides about the
production quantity in the first period and the customer decides the order quantity in the
second. The authors propose a bi-directional return policy, where the customer partially
compensates the supplier for the overproduction in the first period, while the supplier buys
back obsolete inventory at the end of the second period. This contract also coordinates
the channel and allows arbitrary profit allocation, but disregards fixed costs and allows
shortages.
Sabbaghi et al. [86] present a capacity constrained newsvendor problem and prove the
surprising result that in this case even the simple linear wholesale price can coordinate
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the channel. The model is then generalised also to the multiple suppliers setting. This
study provides promising perspectives for the research of capacity constrained coordination,
which should be analysed also with asymmetric information.
Models with Asymmetric Information Structure
These problems are generally studied by the economy with asymmetric information, a
discipline spawned from game theory [87]. Following the traditional nomenclature, when
the information asymmetry affects a decision variable (i.e., the action of the agents cannot
be observed), this raises a moral hazard problem and when the asymmetry affects an
external parameter, it is called an adverse selection problem.
The main model is called the principal – agent model, where the decisions are sequential.
When the player with the incomplete information is the leader, it is called screening model.
In this case, the aim of the leader is to design such a menu of contracts, from which the
follower’s rational choice is optimal for the leader. On the other hand, when the well-
informed player is the leader, it is a signalling model. Such models are used, when the leader
can offer such a contract that guarantees the truthful revelation of its private information.
This should be in the interest of the leader, because without truthful revelation the so-
called adverse selection may cause market failure (i.e., no deal at all) which is suboptimal
for both players.
The generalisation of screening and signalling models is the terrain of mechanism design
(inverse game theory or game engineering). Here the main goal is that given a system-wide
optimal strategy tuple, one must design such a game where the given strategy tuple is an
equilibrium.
In the supply chain contracting theory the asymmetry is related either to the demand
forecast or to the cost factors. Both screening and signalling models are studied for such
problems. In the practice however, the menu-of-contracts approach is rarely used.
Cachon and Lariviere [8] study the two-period case, when the information asymmetry
affects the qualitative demand forecast, which can be either high or low. The customer who
is better informed, signals the expected demand and the supplier must reserve capacity.
Here, the customer has obviously an incentive to inflate its forecast. Both forced and
voluntary compliance are modelled, and although forced compliance is more efficient in
this case, it is not preferred due to its centralisation of decisions.
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Li et al. [62] model the case when also the qualitative demand forecast is known only
by the customer, but the supplier is the leader. The supplier offers a menu of contracts
consisting of firm orders, options and combined contracts. The authors identify cases when
the combined contract is dominant. One further speciality of this model is that the price
of the end product is stochastic.
Çınar and Bilgiç [19] study within the newsvendor framework the effect of asymmetric
information on the inventory handling cost of the customer. The supplier is the leader,
who offers a menu of firm order and option contracts. They assume forced compliance,
show the existence (but not the uniqueness) of the equilibrium and derive the conditions
for channel coordination. This paper also contains an excellent literature review.
Ülkü et al. [108] consider the one supplier and multiple customers case. They assume
that all demand can be satisfied with additional emergency production, but this means
higher unit production cost without any fixed cost. The authors examine whether the
supplier or the customers have to take the responsibility and consequences of the decision.
They conclude, that the situation where the decision and the risk is at the supplier’s side
(so-called risk pooling) is always desirable for the customers, but can be inefficient on
the system level. They also study such a contract which helps avoid the so-called double
marginalisation effect.
Chu and Lee [17] study a newsvendor problem where the supplier decides about in-
ventory levels, while the customer is better informed about the expected market demand.
They consider the cost of information sharing, but assume, that if any information is
shared, it is truthful without further incentives. They do not focus on different contract
and channel coordination, but the conditions, under which information sharing is rational
at all.
Zhou [128] analyses the case, when the random demand depends on the retail price
as well as on a parameter known only by the customer. In this setting, the supplier
is the leader who can offer different types of price discount contracts. Although these
contracts cannot coordinate the channel, the author examines the channel efficiency, i.e.,
the approximation of the first-best solution. The paper also contains comparisons of the
supplier’s and customer’s profits.
Lutze and Özer [70] consider the situation where the customer’s shortage cost (or service
level) is a private information, but has a known distribution. The described model assumes
static stochastic demand, no setup cost and allows backlogs. The authors study the be-
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haviour of the supply chain applying promised lead-time contracts—i.e., when the supplier
guarantees on-time delivery of arbitrary orders after a given lead-time—and compare the
performance both with the full information and the centralised control case.
2.3.3 Models with Longer Horizon
The studies of the longer horizon problems usually apply either the EOQ or the base-
stock model. As far as I know, the dynamic, rolling horizon version of forecast sharing is
not yet studied. Furthermore, I have found only a few papers that consider asymmetric
information and models the problem mostly as a repeated newsvendor games. However,
in order to gain an insight into the existing solution approaches, some related models are
reviewed below in order of their appearance.
Lee and Whang [60] study an infinite-horizon case where the periodic demands are
identically and independently distributed. They assume that unsatisfied demand is back-
logged and disregard fixed costs, therefore the first-best solution is a multi-echelon version
of the base-stock model. The paper emphasises the importance of performance measure-
ment schemes and proves, that a compensation scheme consisting of four parts—transfer
pricing, consignment, backlog penalty and shortage reimbursement—can coordinate the
channel in this case.
Cachon [6] considers an infinite horizon model with exponentially distributed demand-
arrival times, lost sales and applies the base-stock solution. The traditional one-period
contract types are studied in the paper and they are proved to be unable to coordinate
the channel, as well as every other one-parameter contracts. Cachon proposes combining
inventory sharing with a lost sale transfer for channel coordination and shows, that this
will increase the supply chain inventory level in order to decrease the number of shortages.
Cachon and Fischer [7] consider a single-supplier, multiple customers market with static
stochastic demand and backlogging. They found that the value of information sharing
in this case is limited and did not study further the possibilities of coordination. They
concluded that information sharing is more beneficial when the demand is fluctuating and
the capacities are practically unconstrained thus supply can be flexible adapted to demand.
Corbett [21] studies two different problems with static stochastic demand-arrival times,
setup cost and backlogs applying the (Q, r) model. In one case, the information asymmetry
is about the supplier’s setup cost and in the other, about the backlogging cost of the
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customer. For both problems, the author examines screening solutions, i.e., the principal
offers a menu of contracts. In both cases, the principal must know a priori distribution
about the private information of the agent. The results of the analysis show that the
optimal menus of contract can decrease inventory levels in a supply chains, but cannot
coordinate the channel.
Caldentey and Wein [11] consider a full information model with Poisson-distributed
demand-arrival times, no fixed setup costs, voluntary compliance and backlogs, which
setting is handled by base-stock policy. They show that in this situation a cost-sharing
agreement can coordinate the channel, furthermore it increases the service level of the
system comparing to the case without contracting.
Xu [123] regards the dynamic version of the multi-period supply chain model, where the
demand of each period can have different distributions, but all knowledge is symmetric.
The author proposes a cancellation contract, i.e., the customer can cancel a portion of
the order for a linear penalty. A dynamic programming algorithm is used to derive the
optimal policy in the finite horizon case. The infinite horizon case with static demand
distribution and discounted cost is also considered, which can be solved with the help of
the Bellman equation. Although cancellation contract cannot coordinate the channel, it is
easy to implement and beneficial for both parties.
Chu et al. [18] model an assembly system with two suppliers providing complementary
components with different lead-times. The paper assumes that there is no fixed cost and the
demand can be backlogged, therefore base-stock model is appropriate for this situation.
The possible Stackelberg games are examined and the authors also propose a channel
coordinating mechanism for this specific system.
Gupta and Weerawat [41] study the supply problem for customised mass products,
where the demand-arrival times follow a Poisson distribution. They consider three variants
of the problem: one follows the assumptions of the base-stock model, one offers guaranteed
service level (in terms of lead-time) and the last one assumes lost sales. The authors
propose a two-part revenue-sharing scheme (with a linear and a non-linear part), which is
proved to coordinate the channel.
Sarmah et al. [89] review existing coordination approaches applying the EOQ model and
a quantity discount contract. The authors point out an important limitation of the existing
models concluding “to make coordination successful, faith between the parties and true
revelation of information is necessary which model builder should take into consideration
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in their model in future”.
Kwak et al. [56] model long-term replenishment contracts assuming VMI applying the
(Q, r) policy. In their model the supplier has full information, while the customer is
not familiar with the cost parameters of the supplier. The authors assume exogenous
wholesale price, thus the decision variables are only the reorder point (r), the order quantity
(Q) and the length of the horizon. The paper contains a buyer-driven model, where the
customer decides about all parameters, and a supplier-driven model, in which the supplier
is responsible for determining the order quantity. The studied long-term contract cannot
coordinate the channel, but its performance is compared to the centralised case in order
to analyse the efficiency gain.
Yao et al. [124] study the deterministic static demand case with fixed costs, therefore
the EOQ model is applied. They compare the traditional supply with the VMI setting
and examine the benefits of the latter both for the supplier and for the customer. Channel
coordination contracts are not considered in this paper.
Ren et al. [84] models the newsvendor setting on a longer horizon as a repeated game.
The demand is considered to be scaled random (i.e., random high or random low), whose
distribution is known by the supplier only with an additional white noise, therefore the
customer has to share her forecast with him. The authors propose measuring the forecast
quality and compensating the supplier for the inappropriate forecast. However, due to
the stochastic nature of the demand, this measurement does not reflect the customer’s
truthfulness and furthermore, it is suboptimal for both parties. Instead of this approach,
the authors present a review strategy, which means credibility checking in a longer time
interval with a tolerance zone. This coordinates the channel by inspiring the parties to
prefer long-term benefits to short-term interests. Another important element of their model
is that they consider the short product life-cycles by including a (static) probability of run-
out into their model.
Sarmah et al. [90] study the coordination problem assuming static, deterministic de-
mand and setup cost which is handled by the EOQ model. The main aim of the paper is
to provide guaranteed profit targets for the parties and share the surplus above that level.
Two different coordination mechanisms are presented, the credit option and the discount
contracts, which are shown to be equivalent under certain conditions. The authors point
out in the conclusion that disregarding the problem of truthful information sharing makes
the model unadaptable in practical situations, therefore future research have to take aim
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at the challenge of relaxing the full information assumption.
Yue and Raghunathan [125] models the effects of applying returns policy in a repeated
purchasing situation. In this setting, the supplier is the leader, he has to determine
the wholesale price, then the customer decides about the retail price and order quan-
tity. The realised demand is stochastic—both high-low qualitative and continuous cases
are considered—, price sensitive and unknown to the supplier. The paper does not study
whether the returns policy coordinates the channel or not; only compares it to the tradi-
tional purchasing without returns.
Frascatore and Mahmoodi [36] consider a repeated newsvendor game with symmetric
information, static demand and no setup cost, where the obsolete buffer of one period is
not lost, but can be consumed later. In their model, the supplier is the Stackelberg leader,
who determines the wholesale price, then the customer orders. The authors first introduce
a long-term contract and proves, that when the length of the contract horizon increases, the
channel performance approaches the optimal (coordinated) behaviour, but never achieves
it. They also presents a penalty contract, where the supplier must pay penalty in case of
shortages. This second approach can coordinate the channel, but provides zero profit for
the supplier.
Chapter 3
Extended Models of the Lot-Sizing
Problem
Planning tasks of enterprises are usually categorised according to their horizons into three
levels: long-term, medium-term and short-term, as it was described in Section 2.1. In this
chapter I chiefly focus on the medium-term planning problem, but at the end, I examine
its relationship with the short-term level.
When make-to-order production is not possible, manufacturers have to plan their pro-
ductions based on forecast. These forecasts are usually created from historical statistics—
which process is sometimes called as “guesstimation” or “driving by the rear-view mirror”,
referring to its uncertain results. I consider that the component demand is derived from
the production plan, since supply must be aligned with the production instead of the fin-
ished good sales. Components should be produced in large batches in order to decrease
the setup cost, but this comes together with an increase of inventory levels and the risk of
obsolete inventory. The solutions should provide acceptable trade-off between these con-
flicting objectives. My novel models described below consider single-item and no inventory
or capacity limits.
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3.1 Newsvendor Model with Possible Emergency Pro-
duction
The general form of the one-period decision problem is the following: the decision maker
has to determine the value of a variable q, then c(q, ξ) cost arises, where ξ is a random
variable with known distribution. The risk neutral decision maker intends to minimise
its expected cost. In the context of inventory planning of perishable goods, this model is
called the newsvendor model (see Section 2.2).
The standard model disregards the setup cost: it considers per unit left over cost—if
the demand is below the produced quantity—and per unit shortage cost—if the demand
exceeds the produced quantity. However, when the inventory is filled by manufacturing
instead of ordering, then the setup cost must be included in the calculation. In my model,
service level has the highest priority, hence it follows that the manufacturer has to satisfy
all demand. If the produced quantity is below the actual demand, then it can only be
satisfied by an emergency production which also involves an additional setup. Thus, due
to the incurring setup cost, I modified the newsvendor model in a non-trivial way. To the
best of my knowledge, all previous variants of the newsvendor model disregard such fixed
cost because of the complexity of the resulted problem. The main parameters of my model
are as follows [34]:
cs setup cost,
cp production cost per unit,
φ probability density function (PDF) of the demand,
Φ cumulative density function (CDF) of the demand,
ξ realised demand,
s minimal production quantity,
q production quantity (decision variable) and
Z total cost (objective function).
3.1.1 The Optimal Lot-Size
I consider continuous consumption, therefore certain amount must be produced at the
beginning in order to avoid shortage, i.e., q > 0. Practically, I assume q ≥ s, where s > 0
is an appropriate minimal production quantity, wherewith the probability of the obsolete
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inventory Pr(ξ < s) is acceptably small. I also assume that if the originally produced
quantity is not enough, then at the time of the emergency production the final demand
quantity is already known.
The model considers fixed setup cost, where the eventual emergency production comes
also together with an extra setup. This way the total cost will consist of four parts:
i.) the certain setup cost: cs,
ii.) the production cost for satisfying the actual demand: cpξ,
iii.) the value of obsolete left over products1: cp max(q − ξ, 0) and
iv.) the cost of additional setup: csδ(ξ − q), where
δ(ξ − q) =
{
0 , if ξ − q ≤ 0
1 , if ξ − q > 0 . (3.1)
The expected total cost in function of the production quantity becomes:
E[Z(q)] = cs + cpE[ξ] + cpE[max(q − ξ, 0)] + csE[δ(ξ − q)]. (3.2)
Proposition 3.1 The derivative of the expected total cost function is
dE[Z(q)]
dq
= cpΦ(q) − csφ(q). (3.3)
Proof. Using the definition of the expectation value one can express:
E[max(q − ξ, 0)] =
q∫
−∞





E[δ(ξ − q)] =
∞∫
q
φ(x)dx = 1 − Φ(q). (3.5)
From these expressions the statement of the proposition follows. 
Determining the root of this derivative function is not as easy as in the standard model,
because it is not invertible in the general case, therefore I focus on a special probability
1The production cost of the remaining inventory is considered to be lost.
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distribution. The normal distribution leads to a problem where it is hard to determine the
root analytically, hence I regard the logistic distribution, whose PDF is similar to the PDF
of the normal distribution, but has longer tails. In Fig. 3.1 the PDFs of the logistic and
normal distributions with the same expectation value and variance can be seen; with solid
and dashed curves respectively.
Normal distribution
Logistic distribution
Figure 3.1: Comparison of the PDFs.











and it has the expectation value and variance m and σ2 = 1
3
π2b2, respectively. It can be
seen that the logistic distribution has a simpler form than the normal distribution, but
otherwise they have similar properties.
Theorem 3.2 There exists an optimal lot-size q∗ which minimises the expected total cost
iff b < cs
cp
. In this case, the optimal lot-size is unique:
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cs − bcp . (3.9)
After taking the logarithm of this equation q∗ can be expressed as Eq. 3.7, which has a
real solution iff the argument of the logarithm is positive. Since both b and cp are positive,
this yields the condition b < cs
cp
.








Furthermore, the derivative 3.8 is a continuous function with only one root, thus q∗ is also
the global minimum place. 
This optimal lot-size gives a balance between the risk of obsolete inventory and the
additional setup. It can be either more or less than the expectation value, depending on
the variance and cost parameters, see Sect. 3.4.1 for a specific example.
3.1.2 Discussion
As an illustration, taking a particular industrial example with m = 65553, cs = 45331 and
cp = 3.29, the shape of the expected total cost function can be seen in Fig. 3.2.
The percentage numbers express the relative deviation (r) from the expected demand,




. When the deviation is low (e.g., r = 10%)),
then an incorrect lot-size causes significant raise in the expected total cost. The shape of
this curve can be explained in the following way:
i.) there is a unique optimum, q∗, given by Eq. 3.7,
ii.) decreasing q starting from the optimum increases the probability of the additional
setup cost, however, the expected obsolete inventory is decreasing, therefore the
function is bounded, and
iii.) increasing q starting from the optimum decreases the expected additional setup cost,
but the expected obsolete inventory increases arbitrarily.
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Figure 3.2: Deterioration of the cost function.
As the diagram shows, the minimal expected total cost grows together with the relative
deviation. The curve with r = 40%—where b ≥ cs
cp
—is degenerated in the sense that it
has no positive optimum; the s minimal quantity should be produced to avoid immediate
shortage.
Using this model one can also express the cost for being present on an uncertain market.
If the demand was certain, the total cost would be cs + mcp, without additional setup and
obsolete left over. The value of
ΔZ = E[Z(q∗)] − (cs + mcp) (3.11)
thus can be interpreted as the cost of uncertainty. Fig. 3.3 demonstrates this kind of cost,
using the same m, cs and cp parameters as in the previous example and let r range in the
(0, 30%] interval.
3.2 Wagner –Whitin Model with Run-Out
In this section I study the dynamic lot-sizing problem on a medium-term horizon. It is an
exogenous property of the modern markets that the product life-cycles are short and un-
certain, thus demand for a product can suddenly cease and this run-out produces obsolete
inventory. This happens more frequently in case of the non-standardisable (customised)
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Figure 3.3: Cost of the uncertain market.
packaging materials, where design changes are common. The run-out must be taken into
account, because obsolete products cause significant financial loss for the manufacturers
let alone the waste of environmental resources. This phenomenon is illustrated in Fig. 3.4
with data coming from a real Enterprise Resource Planner (ERP) system. Note that in
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Figure 3.4: An example for the run-out and obsolete inventory.
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To handle this problem, I build upon the standard Wagner – Whitin model and gen-
eralise it to the case when the demand can cease in an arbitrary period of the planning
horizon [29]. The properties of the model denoted with WWr according to the aspects
presented in Section 2.2 are as follows: single-echelon, single-item, discrete time scale, fi-
nite horizon, no backlogs, deterministic demand forecast, possibility of run-out, one period
lead-time, no capacity constraint and minimising expected cost (setup, inventory holding
and obsolete inventory). The parameters in my model are as follows:
n length of the horizon,
F1, . . . , Fn ≥ 0 forecasted demand,
cs setup cost,
h inventory holding cost per piece per period,
cp production cost per piece (cost of obsolete inventory per piece),
η ∈ { 1, . . . } period of the run-out2(random variable),
x0, . . . , xn production quantities (decision variables) and
I0, . . . , In inventory at the end of the periods (auxiliary variables).
I also consider one period production time, i.e., the quantity produced in one period is
available in the next one.
3.2.1 The WWr Model
Without loss of generality it can be assumed that the inventory is zero initially. I also
assume that F1 > 0 (otherwise the decision can be delayed). These assumptions imply
that production is necessary in the actual period (period 0), i.e., x0 > 0.
The goal is to construct such a production plan (x0, . . . , xn) which satisfies the fore-
casted demand in every period and minimises the expected cost consisting of the setup cost
in period 0 plus the expected cost on the horizon. This latter is the sum of the possible
setups plus the inventory holding costs (assuming linear consumption within a period) if
no run-out happens, and the cost of obsolete inventory in case of run-out of each period of
the horizon. Formally:











+ Pr(η = i)cpIi−1
)
, (3.12)
2This can also be interpreted as the length of the remaining product life.
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0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
. (3.13)
The stochastic programming formulation of the model is as follows:
min E[Z] (3.14)
s. t.
I0 = x0 (3.15)
Ii = Ii−1 − Fi + xi (i ∈ { 1, . . . , n }) (3.16)
Ii−1 ≥ Fi (i ∈ { 1, . . . , n }) (3.17)
xi ≥ 0 (i ∈ { 0, . . . , n }). (3.18)
Eq. 3.15 expresses that we start with an empty inventory, i.e., the inventory at the
beginning of the horizon equals the production in period 0. Eq. 3.16 states that the
planned inventory at the end of a period equals to the inventory at the beginning of the
period plus the production minus the demand of that period. Eq. 3.17 guarantees that
the demand can be always satisfied from inventory. Eq. 3.18 constrains the production
quantities to be non-negative.
The following basic property of this problem—whose proof is analogous to the one
which can be found in most textbooks—will be useful:
Proposition 3.3 (Wagner – Whitin property) Given a (x0, . . . , xn, I0, . . . , In) optimal
solution of the (3.14 – 3.18) stochastic program. Then
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i.) In = xn = 0
ii.) (Ii−1 − Fi)δ(xi) = 0 (i ∈ { 1, . . . , n }).
Hence the search space can be narrowed to the feasible solutions with the Wagner –
Whitin property. The latter complementarity condition states that either the inventory
level would be zero at the end of period i and thus the production is allowed, or the
inventory level would be positive and the production quantity is zero. This equation can
be interpreted as the lack of speculative motives, i.e., it is always preferable to produce at
a later period rather than producing earlier and holding stock.
3.2.2 Algorithm for Solving the WWr Model
Let us assume that we produce in period t for the next j periods. This implies that
i.) the product has not run out until period t, which has a probability Pr(η > t) and
ii.) It = xt =
t+j∑
i=t+1
Fi (from the Wagner – Whitin property).
Then the expected inventory holding cost in period i ∈ { t + 1, . . . t + j } can be expressed
as













and the cost of expected obsolete inventory is




The expected cost of producing in period t for j periods including the setup cost is therefore
Ctj = cs +
t+j∑
i=t+1
(H(t, j, i) + O(t, j, i)) . (3.21)
Exploiting the Wagner – Whitin property, the optimal cost for periods { t, . . . , n } (Zt)
can be computed with the following recursion:
Zn := 0 (3.22)
Zt := min
j∈{ 1,... n−t }
{Ctj + Pr(η > t + j | η > t)Zt+j} (t ∈ { 0, . . . , n − 1 }). (3.23)
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This expresses that we are searching a particular j value having the following property: if
we produce for the next j periods and for the rest of the horizon we achieve the already
known minimal cost—as long as no run-out happens during the j periods—then the cost
on the { t, . . . , n } horizon will be minimal. The optimal x0, . . . , xn production quantities
achieving the minimal cost thus can be determined in two phases:
i.) determine the possible xt values, i.e., if we produce in period, we have to produce
exactly xt and
ii.) determine the periods in which we have to produce; in other periods xt must be set
to zero.
The first phase can be computed by backward induction using recursion (3.22-3.23). Let
us define the following functions that will be used in the algorithm:


















+ Pr(η > t + j)Zt+j
)
(3.24)





is the production quantity in period t for the next j periods. The WWr algorithm can be
seen in Fig. 3.6.
The compute(t, j) procedure computes V (t, j) and Q(t, j) functions and stores them
in variables V and Q. For each t the algorithm determines the optimal j value, which
necessitates the computation of V (t, j)—which can be done in linear time—thus all in all
the running time of the algorithm is O(n3).
3.2.3 Special Probability Distributions of Run-Out
My original formulation of the WWr model considered that in the beginning of each pe-
riod the product runs out with probability p, i.e., the run-out probability has geometric










for j ← 2 to n − t do
call compute(t, j)






Q ← x0  Second phase
for t ← 1 to n do
Q ← Q − Ft










for i ← t + j to t + 1 by −1 do
Q ← Q + Fi
V ← V + Pr(η > i) ∗ h ∗ (Q − Fi/2) + Pr(η = i) ∗ cp ∗ Q
end for
V ← V + Pr(η > t + j) ∗ Zt+j
V ← cs + V/ Pr(η > t)
end procedure
Figure 3.6: The WWr algorithm.
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distribution. In the previous section I presented the generalised version enabling arbitrary
distribution. The geometric distribution is unappropriate when the run-out probability
should grow the farther we look into the future. For this reason, in [73] the Poisson-
distribution was proposed to model the run-out probability. In what follows, I compare
three different distributions, which are possible alternatives for characterising run-out. Ta-
ble 3.1 summarises some properties of the distributions, while Fig. 3.7 shows an example
of the run-out probabilities in each period.
Table 3.1: Comparison of the distributions.
Geometric (p) Uniform (N) Poisson (λ)





if i ≤ N



















if i ≤ N






Note that the V (t, j) and Q(t, j) functions can be determined using a recursion:




Pr(η > t + 1)h
Ft+1
2
+ Pr(η = t + 1)cpFt+1
+ Pr(η > t + j)Zt+j
)
, (3.26)







Pr(η > i) +
h
2




Pr(η = i) + Pr(η > t + j + 1)Zt+j+1 − Pr(η > t + j)Zt+j
)
(3.27)
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Figure 3.7: Example of the geometric, uniform and Poisson distributions with the same
expected value.
and
Q(t, 1) = Ft+1, (3.28)
Q(t, j + 1) = Q(t, j) + Ft+j+1. (3.29)
Using geometric and uniform distributions, compute(t, j) procedure can be simplified by
calculating V and Q based on their previous values in constant time, therefore the algorithm
can be modified to run in O(n2) time.
3.2.4 Heuristics
The more remote a forecast is, the more uncertain it is3—this reasonable hypothesis was
confirmed by extensive analysis of historical industrial data. Based on this observation,
the first idea was to disregard the less trusted remote forecasts and plan only the starting
3This is usually referred to as the third law of forecasting [45].
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segment of the horizon. Therefore I developed two heuristic methods which minimise
the expected average cost—both per time unit and per piece—in the first segment of the
horizon [32, 109]. These approaches turn the problem into a continuous form, but in other
aspects, they resemble to the Silver – Meal heuristic [95]. They assume that the lot-size
can cover an arbitrary front fragment of the forecast horizon which minimises the expected
average cost either by the length of the expected consumption period or by the produced










Figure 3.8: Planning horizon of the heuristics.
I modified the notations here to match this approach: let Sk :=
∑k
l=1 Fl be the accu-
mulated forecast of the first k periods and q(x) := Si−1 + yFi is the production quantity,
where i := x + 1 and y := {x} (here x means the integer, and {x} the fractional part
of x). This expresses, that we produce all quantities of the first (i − 1) periods, and the y
proportion of the demand of period i. The expected decrease of the inventory level can be
seen in Fig. 3.9.
If one does not consider run-out and assumes linearly decreasing inventory within a
period, then the expected inventory holding cost in the first l (l < i) time unit is:








where q(x) − Sk−1 is the opening inventory of the period k, and Fk2 expresses the linearly
consumption within the period. Hence, the expected storage cost with run-out can be























(Pr(η = k)H(k − 1, x)) + Pr(η > i)
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If the product is still saleable in period i, both the storage cost of the first (i − 1) periods
and the storage cost of the remaining fraction4 incur. The cost of the obsolete inventory




(Pr(η = k)(q(x) − Sk−1)) + cp Pr(η = i)yFi. (3.32)
Thus we obtain piecewise continuously differentiable average cost functions
Ax(x) =





cs + H(x) + O(x)
q(x)
. (3.34)
They can be minimised by searching through the roots of the their derivative and the
borders of the periods.
As it has turned out, the heuristics have several disadvantages comparing with the WWr
algorithm: (i) they cannot estimate the number of setups on the horizon, (ii) disregarding a
part of the available information can lead to significant inefficiency and (iii) they sometimes
4The quantity yFi is consumed only during y period.
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Figure 3.10: Anomaly of the heuristics.
behave unreasonably: increasing the probability of run-out can cause higher lot-size, an
example can be found in Fig. 3.10.
The lines show average costs in case of different run-out probabilities considering ge-
ometric run-out distribution. If p = 0.15, producing the demand of 17 time units would
minimise the average cost, while the higher p suggests 22 time units. According to the
experiments, this phenomenon occur rarely, and when run-out probability is relatively high
(p > 0.13). Note that such anomalies are known in the field of operations management;
see e.g., the nervousness syndrome in the widely used MRP method, when a decrease in
the demand leads to an infeasible situation [45].
3.3 Practical Considerations
In this section I briefly mention some additional topics, which cannot be considered sci-
entific results, but are essential in practical applications of the previous models. Firstly, I
propose a framework for determining which model should be applied in specific situations.
The presented simple rules were created by studying actual industrial problems and dis-
cussing them with industrial experts—which also confirmed the practical applicability of
the theoretical models. Secondly, I regard the problem when no estimations for the product
life-cycle are available. Finally, I briefly present the role of safety stocks in allowing 100%
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service level and in coupling medium- and short-term planning levels.
3.3.1 Choosing the Appropriate Method
There are two fundamentally different situations: (i) the fact of the run-out and its date
are known a priori and (ii) run-out can occur with a certain probability, but no further
details are known. The first run-out situation also covers two cases: the rolling and the
instant change. When the change is rolling, the stored products can be still sold, hence
obsolete inventories are not created. However, at instant change on one hand there is the
risk of producing obsolete inventory, while on the other hand the necessity of additional
production due to incorrect forecasts. In the second case the possibility of run-out must also
be considered, since a greedy inventory policy can lead to significant obsolete inventories.
In case of the unknown run-out date, both the WWr and the heuristic policies can
be applied. One practically useful property of WWr in contrast to the heuristic ones is
that it can approximate the number of setups on a longer horizon in advance. In order to
handle also the dynamically changing forecasts, I propose a rolling horizon approach, i.e.,
the algorithm should be run in every period with the most actual data. Note that if we use
WWr on a rolling horizon, only the first production quantity (x0) is important, therefore
the second phase of the algorithm in Fig. 3.6 can be skipped.
In case of known run-out date, it should be distinguished whether the date is near or
far. It can be considered near, if the previous methods (especially WWr) suggest that all
forecasted quantities have to be produced immediately in one lot. If the date is far, then
the standard Wagner – Whitin algorithm can be applied.
However, if the date is near, the horizon can be considered one period long, hence in
this case I propose using the extended newsvendor model which minimises the expected
total cost allowing additional emergency production. The advantage of this approach is
that the optimal lot-size can exceed the total forecasted quantity, thus an extra setup may
be avoided. Fig. 3.11 summarises the proposed selection from the models, while Table 3.2
compares their main properties.
3.3.2 Sensitivity and What-If Analysis
While forecasts and most of the cost parameters are easily accessible in existing trans-
actional ERP systems, the estimates of product life-cycles are sometimes not available.
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Figure 3.11: Selecting the appropriate model.
Table 3.2: Summary of the lot-sizing methods.
ACx, ACq WWr Newsvendor
Length of the horizon n n 1
Minimises expected average cost total cost total cost
Model continuous discrete continuous
Lot-size can exceed total forecast no no yes
Gives number of setups no yes 1 or 2
Uncertainty run-out run-out demand quantity
However, it turned out that applying the WWr model with some real-life production plans
where planned manufacturing of a product is sparse and involves large volumes—quantity
is almost everywhere zero—the methods are not too sensitive to the uncertainty. To mea-
sure this sensitivity, an interval around the parameters can be examined instead of only
a single value. Fig. 3.12 illustrates an example of the sensitivity analysis using the ACq
heuristic with geometric run-out distribution. It can be seen that the lot-size is a step
function, i.e., a small modification of the p parameter rarely affects the optimal solution.
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Figure 3.12: Sensitivity analysis of the parameter.
The implemented algorithms were included in a pilot lot-sizing application, where the
following approach was used: the algorithms run with different run-out parameters in
parallel, and from these scenarios the program calculates a measure for the robustness—in
the meaning as the opposite of sensitivity—of the result. The less robust the proposed
lot-size, the more care is needed from the human experts who evaluate and reconsider the
results.
3.3.3 Safety Stocks
An important assumption of the WWr model is that the demand should be satisfied without
backlogs. Hence, as part of the inventory, safety stock is needed in order to avoid short-
term stock-outs. However, the stock level should not be more than necessary, because that
would conflict with the lean manufacturing principle and may result in obsolete inventory.
The safety stock level can be adjusted by at least four policies:
Fixed value. Simple, not adaptive method. E.g., zero can be used for rare components,
while frequent components can have slightly higher inventory levels, which facilitate
the flexibility of the production.
Forward coverage. The safety stock is based on the forecasted demand of the next few
time units. The length of the regarded period can be revised in an adaptive man-
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ner. This approach is suitable when demand fluctuation is caused by demand shifts
between periods.
Forecast error. The safety stock is based on the length of throughput time of components
and the standard deviation of historical forecasts. This approach is proper, when
fluctuations are mostly caused by inserted unexpected orders.
Hybrid. The combination of the previous methods.
Using average value of the forecasted demand on a longer horizon could be dangerous,
since large, but far quantities lead to unnecessarily high safety stock levels, while in case of
high short-term demand, shortage may occur even so. After consulting with the industrial
partners, we have agreed on an acceptable default rule of calculating safety stock as the
maximum demand of the next few weeks—namely four weeks in our case. This allows for
the planners certain modifications (optimisation) in the production plan without violating
the continuity of production.
After deciding the size of the safety stock, one can easily determine whether to produce
or not: if the available inventory of the next week (current inventory minus the planned
consumption of the actual week) is not less than the demand of the next week (F1) plus
the safety stock, then no production is needed. If production is necessary, then the forecast
data should be temporarily modified in order to comply with the preconditions of the WWr
model: F1 should be increased with the quantity of the safety stock and decreased with
the available inventory, while further forecasts should be decreased with the safety stock.
This way the net demand is not changing, F1 will be positive and initial inventory can be
considered zero. After these modifications, the WWr algorithm or the heuristics can be
used to compute the appropriate lot-sizes.
3.4 Experiments
In this section I present some results of experimenting with the described algorithms. The
industrial examples are related to packaging material supply, which are typically customised
components and therefore high volatility is especially typical for them. In these case the
setup costs are much larger—almost 15.000 times larger—than the unit production costs,
since materials are relatively cheap, but the setup involves washing out the paints from
the machines in addition to changing the offset plate and the cutter tool.
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Some of the results presented below were made with the InventoSim simulation system
(see Chapter 5); other analyses were carried out with the Order Planner, a pilot lot-sizing
application I implemented as an Excel add-in. Fig. 3.13 shows an example input sheet
for the system. The SapNo column contain the material identifiers5; the Restage is a
flag for denoting foreseen run-outs; the Setup and Price contain the cs and cp parameters,
respectively; Holding Cost is an approximation used as the h parameter in the WWr model;
Stock is the actual inventory level minus the required material for the fixed tasks (thus
it can be negative); the Safety Stock is optional, if left blank, the programme determines
it using some default rules presented in Sect. 3.3.3; the Length denotes the length of the
forecast horizon; then the forecasted quantities follow. The applied algorithm is determined
using the decision tree in Fig. 3.11.
Figure 3.13: Order Planner.
3.4.1 Experiments with the Extended Newsvendor Model
In Table 3.3, I summarise the proposed lot-sizes of the newsvendor model with cs, cp and
m parameters taken from an industrial database and relate to components near to the end
5The material numbers are encoded.
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of their life-cycles.
Table 3.3: Some results of the newsvendor model.
cs cp m r=5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
55269.5 3.15 7152 8035 8640 9137 9562 9933 10260
45997.25 3.29 36733 39316 40330 40627 40366 39600 38333
46046.5 3.29 50899 53979 54781 54451 53152 50864 47433
45892 3.29 38323 40967 41965 42204 41845 40939 39483
45331 3.29 65553 68970 69290 67899 64841 59730 51389
44541 3.29 19807 21538 22464 23055 23407 23564 23548
Since the b parameters are not available in the ERP system of the industrial partner, I
decided to take a series of values, compute the results for each such scenario and compare
their results. I took certain percentages (r) of the forecasted demand as the standard de-
viation and derived the b parameters from them. As a graphical presentation, an extended















Figure 3.14: The effect of uncertainty on the optimal lot-size.
The series of the optimal lot-sizes can be explained in the following way: if there was
no uncertainty, the lot-size would equal to the demand. As the uncertainty increases, it is
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better to increase the lot-size in order to avoid the additional setup. However, when the
uncertainty reaches a certain threshold, the expected cost of obsolete inventory reaches
the expected cost of the additional setup, therefore the optimal lot-size starts to decrease.
If one increased the uncertainty parameter further until b reaches cs/cp, the model would
not be able to provide the optimal lot-size. Nevertheless, as the uncertainty grows, more
attention must be paid by the human experts.
3.4.2 Experiments with the WWr Model
I tested the WWr algorithm on almost 10000 components based on real industrial data
from the Logistics Platform (LP)—see Sect. 5.1 for details about the system. The planning
horizon was theoretically 52 periods (weeks) long, but in several cases the end of the plan
contained zero values, thus the average period length can be considered approximately 39
periods. With such problem sizes I simulated the complete inventory histories, which took
about one hour. This means that for every components several lot-sizing decisions (several
runs of the WWr) had to be made. In a real planning situation however, only 10-20%
of the components has to be produced per period, and each lot-sizing decision requires
only one run on the WWr. Hence, the complete lot-size planning can be done in a few
minutes—even quicker by optimising the database access—, which is abundant for a weekly
planning task. Note that this speed is due to the disregarding of capacity constraints.
I compared the factual inventory levels6 with the simulated inventory levels, an example
of which can be seen in Fig. 3.15.
In fact, it is difficult to evaluate and compare the results, due to the following reasons:
i.) The exact cost parameters (setup, production, inventory holding) are not available
in the LP, I could only estimate them.
ii.) The types of the components (customised or standardised), and therefore information
about the uncertainty is not directly available.
iii.) The types of the procurements (order-based or VMI) are also not available.
iv.) It is the suppliers’ responsibility to register their inventory levels in the system in case
of VMI, but for the time being, most of this information is rarely or never updated.
6I considered the total inventory level in the supply chain, i.e., the sum of the customer’s and supplier’s
inventory.
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Figure 3.15: An example of the inventory level history.
v.) The changes in the inventory levels are often not in accordance with the consumption
data. The main causes of these discrepancies are the unregistered scrap production
and the delayed tracing of inventory levels. This phenomenon can be observed also
in Fig. 3.15.
vi.) The component procurement or production is unknown in the system, thus an in-
crease in the inventory level might be only a data correction, and not an effect of a
setup and production.
vii.) The number and size of the shortages are unknown, since the system contains only
the production and the inventory levels that are naturally always non-negative.
viii.) It is not registered in the system, whether and when a component run-out happens.
The absence of the forecasts or the unvarying inventory levels can denote run-out,
but they are sometimes signs only of temporary pauses in the demand.
Even so, analysing the resulted charts helped to detect and classify some glitches in the
information consistency and the planning processes.
In the example in Fig. 3.15, I used the following estimated, but realistic parameters:
cs = 50000, cp = 3 and h = 0.01. I considered the geometric run-out distribution with p =
0.02, the safety stock as the maximal forecast of the next five weeks, i.e., max(F2, . . . , F6),
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since quantity F1 has to be already in the inventory. If a shortage still happens, the demand
is backlogged and can be satisfied later.
I also run simulations based on randomly generated forecasts with parameters computed
from the real cases. For example, in the case of the component presented in Fig. 3.15, the
average demand is 113, and the fluctuation in the forecasts is 88%, approximately. I ran
the simulation on 1000 different forecasts generated with these parameters7, while every
other parameter was left unchanged. The summary of the results can be seen in Table
3.4 in terms of the average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value of some
relevant characteristics. Note that although in all of the simulations exactly two setups
were optimal, on the real forecast four setups were proposed. This can be explained with
the fact that the real forecasts have varying horizon length—sometimes only one or two
periods—while in the simulations I used the maximal forecast horizon length (n = 22).
Furthermore, the real forecast are not so even as the generated ones assuming uniform
distribution.
Table 3.4: Summary of the simulation runs.
Statistics AVG STD MAX MIN
Number of setups 2 0 2 2
Average lot-size 2359.98 211.34 3045.5 1654
Maximal lot-size 2555.22 257.26 3575 1751
Minimal lot-size 2164.75 257.15 3023 1123
Average inventory 1487.63 147.73 1900.36 1076.92
Maximal inventory 2524.83 249.79 3413 1740
Minimal inventory 256.37 73.21 484 75
Number of shortages 0 0 0 0
Average demand 113.13 12.76 153.12 70
Maximal demand 225.15 16.14 297 169
Cost 114579.04 1301.70 118793.79 110262.21
Average cost per period 4583.16 52.06 4751.75 4410.48
Average cost per total demand 41.00 4.48 63.71 30.58
7I considered that the product does not run out and the only uncertainty in the demand is the 88%
fluctuation.
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I also examined the effects of the inappropriately estimated uncertainty of the life-cycle.
For this purpose, I chose 1153 materials from the database—where the number of inventory
increments (estimated number of setups) were between two and six—, determined their
average demand and forecast fluctuation, and used them as a basis for simulation. The
length of life-cycles was assumed to have geometric distribution with p = 0.02, but the
WWr algorithm ran with different parameters in order to study the changes in the occurrent
cost. It has turned out that using p = 0.01 or p = 0.03 instead of p = 0.02 resulted in an
approximately 2% increase of the cost in average. For further details, see Sect. 4.5
3.5 Summary
In this chapter I presented novel extensions of two classical lot-sizing models. The first one
is the one-period newsvendor model that I modified in order to satisfy the demand with
minimal cost—even if it necessitates setting up an additional production. The second model
is based on the deterministic uncapacitated single-item lot-sizing problem first formalised
and solved by Wagner and Whitin. I introduced a stochastic variable into this model,
the length of the product life-cycle, and showed how the original algorithm should be
modified to solve the new formalism. I also suggested a simple decision rule for choosing
the appropriate model facing practical problems. Finally, I discussed some practical issues
of the models and illustrated them by examples taken from an industrial case study of
packaging material supply.
The newsvendor model with additional setup cost is a completely new approach to
one-period lot-sizing problems; I do not know any similar models in the literature. The
solution—even the existence or the uniqueness—is not as straightforward in general case as
with the standard model, therefore I focused on the special case of the logistic distribution,
which is also an unprecedented idea in the newsvendor problem.
Modifying the Wagner – Whitin model to the case of products with short life-cycle is
also scarce in the literature, I have found one model similar to my approach, though. The
most important difference between WWr and the model I refer to as “Jeppesen” [51] is
that my model considers also the cost of remaining obsolete inventory, which is therefore
included in the objective function. Secondly, I assume deterministic forecast coming from
a production planner system. Jeppesen is a stochastic model which is transformed to a
deterministic one in order to solve it approximately. Thirdly, since Jeppesen is stochastic,
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it plans the production in terms of the (st, St) model, i.e., if a plan is created, it can be
used until the end of the horizon. I consider the forecast changing from period to period,
thus I propose using WWr with rolling horizon approach: in the beginning of every period,
it should be run on the most actual data. Finally, I recommend determining safety stock
only for the actual period in advance of planning the production quantities, while Jeppesen




In the following, I extend the previous models to a more realistic situation: a two-echelon
decentralised supply chain with autonomous enterprises and asymmetric information—
consisting of an end-product manufacturer in the customer’s role and a component sup-
plier. The decentralisation—let alone the information asymmetry—can lead to suboptimal
overall system performance, materialised in more obsolete inventory or unnecessary addi-
tional setups compared to the solutions presented previously. The goal of this chapter is
to offer such channel coordination mechanisms, wherewith the rational operations of the
partners lead to the theoretical optimum on the system level by minimising the effects of
the uncertainties.
Manufacturing uncertainty can be defined as the difference between the amount of re-
quired and available information [78]. In their paper Mula et al. adopt a classification which
distinguishes two types of uncertainty: (i) environmental uncertainty stems from the un-
predictable markets (e.g., demand, supply) and (ii) system uncertainty, which comes from
the production processes (e.g., yield, failures, lead-times, quality). But there is another
possible source of uncertainty: the (iii) planning process uncertainty, when the generated
plan is not appropriate; I call this as unnecessary uncertainty. Such phenomenon occurs,
when human decision makers distort forecast as studied e.g., in [37]. Since the production
plan of a tiern enterprise is the basis of the component forecast for the tiern+1 suppliers,
uncertainties of the plan spread upwards in supply chain. In addition, they not only spread,
but also grow, usually referred to as the bullwhip effect [59].
Sometimes the planners have lack of motivation for determining the best available




Incentive for inflating demand. If the planners are measured by the eventual short-
age, then they tend to overplan demand and forward too optimistic plans towards
suppliers.
Incentive for deflating demand. If the planners are rewarded for overperforming the
plans, then they tend to underestimate the demand and forward too pessimistic
plans toward suppliers. Sometimes similar situation occurs due to forcing the lean
manufacturing paradigm at an extreme level.
In both cases, the suppliers may be aware of these biases of the manufacturer and
may not accept the demand information without critique. They try to correct the forecast
based on past experiences, but this cannot completely restore the quality of the forecast.
The selfish distortion of information will necessarily lead to additional operational costs.
Instead of these inappropriate measures, the planners should be evaluated by planning
imprecision, which would inspire them to create as accurate plans as possible and thus
avoid unnecessary uncertainty.
All along this chapter I assume one-point-inventory between the manufacturer and the
supplier, practically in a VMI setting. The component forecast, which is derived from
the manufacturer’s medium-term production plan is the basic input for the supplier’s lot-
sizing problem. This forecast is uncertain as we have seen, but should represent the best
knowledge of the manufacturer. Actual orders (so-called call-offs) can be given only for one
period ahead for accounting purposes, therefore they must be satisfied with just-in-time
(JIT) delivery from stock. By using the VMI approach, the responsibility of the supplier
is increased: he can arbitrarily determine the production quantity, but this goes hand in
hand with the whole inventory risk, i.e., possessing the occurrent obsolete inventory. This
risk should be compensated by the proposed contracts, which enable the network being
flexible for satisfying the demand, since it does not bound the service level with ex ante
commitments.
On the supplier’s side, infinite capacity is assumed henceforward. It is also assumed
that cost and price parameters are constant, only the production quantities are decision
variables and they should be determined by the supplier. In the following models the
demand forecast is known by the customer, who signals it towards the supplier. The
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forecast is not a simple qualitative information (i.e., high or low) as in several theoretical
studies, but is given either by a distribution function or by discrete component forecast on
a rolling horizon.
Throughout this chapter I assume that the entire demand should be fulfilled by the
supplier, who therefore provides 100% service level. Similarly to the famed zero defects
principle of the Total Quality Management, this requirement is hard to realise in practice,
but has similar motivation: if an acceptable fault tolerance is defined, it is usually realised
as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Since the production quantity is determined by the supplier, the following simple axiom
holds, which is the bottom of my novel coordination mechanisms.
Axiom 4.1 (Basic axiom of channel coordination.) If
i.) there is no information distortion at the information sharing (the signaling is truth-
ful),
ii.) this is a common knowledge and
iii.) the payment is independent from the supplier’s decision,
then the supplier is facing the centralised lot-sizing problem with all required information,
hence his rational decision will be also optimal on the system level.
Note that in contrast to standard games with incomplete information, no common
knowledge about the distribution of the private information (so-called type of the player)
is assumed—which means omitting the Harsanyi Doctrine [79]. In this case that would
lead to a probability distribution (belief) of the demand probability distribution (forecast),
which seems practically inapplicable.
In contrast, I present such coordination mechanisms wherewith the truthful forecast
sharing is rational for the customer, but no other private information need to be shared—
neither the cost parameters of the supplier nor his production quantity. This makes the
issue of cost and profit sharing difficult, therefore it is excluded from this dissertation and
can be a further direction of my research. However, the models guarantee optimal supply
chain performance assuming rational partners.
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4.1 Coordinating the Decentralised Newsvendor Model
In the decentralised newsvendor model, the customer is familiar with the end-product
market, thus she estimates the demand (m and b parameters of the logistic distribution).
A component is produced by the supplier, who knows the actual production and setup
costs (cp and cs). The lot-sizing decision should be made by the supplier, who has to plan
and schedule his own production, manage the inventory and provide 100% service level
towards the customer. The proposed protocol of the supply process is as follows (see also
Fig. 4.1):
i.) The customer signals forecast information towards the supplier, but this may differ
from the real values, therefore I denote these parameters with m′ and b′.
ii.) The supplier decides about the lot-size (q) and produces this quantity.
iii.) The customer faces the demand (ξ), calls-off this quantity from the supplier.
iv.) The supplier delivers min(ξ, q) items instantly. If ξ < q, the obsolete inventory re-
mains at the supplier; but if ξ > q, the supplier has to start an emergency production
for ξ − q items and deliver them as soon as possible.






























Figure 4.1: Protocol of the newsvendor supply process.
I emphasise the assumption that the finally realised demand (ξ) is known by both part-
ners in the end of the process. I present below such a payment function, which guarantees
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that in the above protocol communicating m′ = m and b′ = b is the unique optimum for
the customer, hence due to Axiom 4.1 it coordinates the channel [30, 31].
The main idea is that with VMI the supplier not only offers products, but also flexi-
bility as a service. Accordingly, a composite payment function should be constructed: the
customer must pay not only (i) for the quantity called-off, but also (ii) for the deviation
from the forecast, as well as (iii) for the forecast uncertainty. This payment compensates
the supplier for the eventual obsolete inventory or the additional setup. The parameters
of the decentralised newsvendor model are as follows:
ξ realised demand,
m expected value of the demand,
b parameter of the logistic distribution, proportional to its
standard deviation,
c0 unit price of a component,
c1 unit compensation price,
m′ communicated expected value of the demand
(decision variable of the customer),
b′ communicated parameter of the logistic distribution
(decision variable of the customer),
q production quantity (decision variable of the supplier) and
P (m′, b′, ξ) payment.
The proposed payment function in general form is the following:
P (m′, b′, ξ) = c0ξ +
c1
b′
d(m′, ξ) + f(b′), (4.1)
where d(m′, ξ) is the difference between the communicated and the realised demand and
f(b′) is a monotonically increasing compensation term for uncertainty of the demand. Note
some properties of this function:
i.) it depends only on commonly known parameters,
ii.) the first term in the payment is independent from the decision variables and
iii.) if the customer communicates higher uncertainty (larger b′), it will pay less for the
deviation (second term), but more for the uncertainty (third term) and vice versa.
4.1. COORDINATING THE DECENTRALISED NEWSVENDOR MODEL 69
Deviation from the forecast can be measured e.g., by the simple difference, the ab-
solute difference or the squared difference. I have found that the first two measures are
inappropriate for channel coordination with the proposed payment function, thus I chose
the latter: d(m′, ξ) = (m′ − ξ)2. For this case, I have derived such an f(·) compensation
function, wherewith the payment function inspires the customer towards truthful informa-
tion sharing, hence it coordinates the channel.
Theorem 4.2 If the demand ξ is a random variable from the logistic distribution with
parameters m and b and the payment function is
P (m′, b′, ξ) = c0ξ +
c1
b′




then the expected payment is minimal iff m′ = m and b′ = b.
Proof. The expected payment is the following:
E[P (m′, b′, ξ)] = c0m +
c1
b′




The expected difference can be computed using the definition of the expected value:




(m′)2 + x2 − 2m′x)φ(x)dx = (m′)2 + E[ξ2] − 2m′m. (4.4)
The term E[ξ2] can be expressed from the following basic property of the variance: σ2 =
E[ξ2]−m2 utilising the variance of the logistic distribution: σ2 = π2b2
3
. Then the expected
payment becomes:












In order to minimise the expected payment, its partial derivatives must equal to zero:





(2m′ − 2m). (4.6)
This equals zero iff m′ = m, independently from choosing b′. Furthermore






4.2. COORDINATING THE DECENTRALISED ROLLING HORIZON MODEL 70
i.e., according to the second derivative test, this is a minimum. For computing the other
partial derivative, I already exploit that m′ = m:









This equals zero iff b′ = b, and in this case the second derivative is also positive:







4.2 Coordinating the Decentralised Rolling Horizon
Model
Incentive alignment by compensation for truthful information sharing which can synchro-
nise the decentralised decision making was proposed in [96]. This empirical study mostly
focuses on different benchmarks of collaboration and verifies that this approach can lead
to increased efficiency in practical situations. However, it did not consider any theoretical
models of channel coordination, which I introduce in its framework model below.
The channel coordination in the rolling horizon case is also based on Axiom 4.1. In
order to force truthful information sharing, I took similar approach as in coordinating the
newsvendor model: the quality of the shared information should be measured and the sup-
plier should be compensated proportional to the measurement. However, regarding rolling
horizon planning this results in a fundamentally different problem. The basic assumptions
of the model are as follows:
Vertically integrated two echelon supply chain system. I consider a customer and
a supplier working together on the long run. This is a typical situation with the
custom component suppliers in case of mass customisation. The supply network is
reconfigured time and again, but I consider the stable periods of its operation when
suppliers are contracted for producing particular components. There is no overlap
between the supply channels, hence suppliers are not competitors. They compete at
reconfiguration, but this strategic network design problem is out of the scope of the
present dissertation.
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Service level. The most important criteria is still that end-customer demand must be
fulfilled at the highest service level as possible. I assume, that the forecast-demand
difference follows certain rules (i.e., some random alteration on the long-term and
demand shifting between periods on short-term horizon). Hence with the assumption
of practically infinite capacity and the usage of appropriate safety stock calculations
to cover the production lead-time (see Section 3.3.3) the shortages can be avoided
with very high probability. Therefore I assume, 100% service level is achievable.
Asymmetric information. I consider similar information decentralisation as in the de-
centralised newsvendor model: the supplier knows the production related cost param-
eters, while the manufacturer is more familiar with the component demand forecast
and uncertainty.
Plan sharing. As far as here, I suggest, that the supplier should decide about component
production and inventories. For this reason, customer should signal the demand re-
lated information to him. Again, if the information sharing is truthful, the supplier
will possess all available information for the appropriate planning. Since the manu-
facturer has clear incentives to distort the information (or to plan it sloppily), this
phenomenon should be eliminated by a proper compensation payment.
Long-term coordination contract. Since the network configuration is considered per-
manent, the compensation should prevail on the long term.
Commonly known realised demand. VMI and the 100% service level assumption im-
plies that the supplier knows the realised demand—just as in the newsvendor model—,
because the customer can call-off neither more, nor less from the inventory than de-
manded.
Firstly, I focus on the possible ways of measuring forecast quality [27] and then I
describe how these measurements can be used for compensation in order to coordinate the
channel [111]. The parameters and variables used in this section are as follows:
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n length of the forecast horizon,
n′ length of the stability horizon (n′ ≤ n),
Fi,j forecast for period i made in period j (j + 1 ≤ i ≤ j + n),
ξi realised demand in period i,
c0 unit price of a component,
c1 unit compensation price,
c2 compensation price for run-out possibility,
αi discount factor of period i,
ηj ∈ { 1, . . . } period of the run-out estimated in period j,
ei error of period i,
dj deviation of the forecast generated in period j and
Pk payment for the period k.
4.2.1 Measuring Forecast Imprecision on Rolling Horizon
By planning imprecision I mean the difference between the forecasted and the realised de-
mand. The difference between consecutive forecasts—which is the cause of the nervousness
syndrome—is measured as planning instability [44]. Imprecision can be measured in two
ways: either in absolute or in relative form. While relative imprecision is meaningful for the
management, the former approach is more useful for compensational purposes, therefore
I describe only these measurements, however they can be easily modified to the relative
ones.
Measuring planning imprecision on single-horizon seems to be easy: one must compare
the forecasted and the realised demand for the same period. This kind of measurement is
widely utilised, the most frequently used variants are
Forecast Error: FEi = Fi − ξi,
Absolute Forecast Error: AFEi = |Fi − ξi|,
Squared Forecast Error: SFEi = (Fi − ξi)2,
where Fi is the forecasted demand for period i (with single-horizon planning the second
index would be constant). Difference in an interval is measured as the mean of the errors:
BIAS: the mean of FEs. It is useful to show the direction of the planning difference on
the horizon: if it is positive (negative), then the plan is systematically overestimated
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(underestimated). Its absolute value shows the rate of the over-/underestimation.
Since positive and negative errors weaken each other, BIAS cannot truly measure
the imprecision.
Mean absolute deviation (MAD): the mean of AFEs. It is a better planning impre-
cision measurement than BIAS, while it eliminates its weakening effect.
Mean squared deviation (MSD): the mean of SFEs. It is frequently used instead of
MAD, when the larger penalty rates for larger errors are more adequate.
In the rolling horizon case, plans are generated period by period for a fixed horizon.
Since these plans are overlapping, measuring imprecision is not as straightforward, as the
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Figure 4.2: Rolling horizon planning.
In this example, the length of the forecast horizon is five periods. Therefore in period
0, the plan is made for periods 1..5 (see row 0). In addition, the realised demand for
the period 0 is denoted with black background. For period 1, the plan is 150 just as the
realised demand (row 1), therefore the plan proved to be right. This is true also for period
2, but for period 3, the forecast is 150 and the realised demand is 200 (row 3). There are
other forecasts for period 3: the forecast made in period 1 is also wrong, but the forecast
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generated in period 2 is right. (There are two other forecasts for period 3, they were made
in periods -1 and -2, which are not included in the figure.)
The question is, how to measure the imprecision considering plans made in different
periods? This is an important problem in the practice, because imprecise planning makes
the behaviour of the system suboptimal even in the centralised case. An experimental
study of this effect in multi-level rolling horizon planning can be found in [48].
Similarly to [44], I differentiate forecast horizon from stability horizon. Forecast horizon
consists of periods for which forecast has been made. Stability horizon is a part of the
forecast horizon, where imprecision of the forecast have serious effect (see again Fig. 4.2).
Imprecision should be measured only on the stability horizon, therefore for this analysis the
length of the forecast horizon is irrelevant, and only the stability horizon matters. This can
be interpreted as n′ = n an assumption made all along the theoretical part of this section.
However, I discuss the n′ < n case more informally in Section 4.4.2. Note that the name
of “stability horizon” means, that one measures imprecision on this horizon and not that
its demand is frozen.
In the next two subsections I present two of the several possible metrics that I found
practically relevant. I suggest using the error in make-to-order purchasing, where small
modifications in the forecast may completely alter the production plans, while the less
rigourous deviation is more appropriate in a make-to-stock environment.
Error of the Periods
The error of a period i measures the weighted absolute differences of a period’s realised




αi−j |Fi,j − ξi| . (4.10)




αi = 1. This expresses that the forecast for far periods can be less
important than the ones for near periods. The most widespread discount types are:
Constant discount: in this case every weight is equal, the periods are equally important
thus the error becomes the mean of the differences, i.e., αi =
1
n′ .
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Linearly decreasing discount: αi =
2−a
n′ −(i−1) 2−2an′2−n′ , where 0 < a < 1 is a parameter.
The weights approach the constant discount factor as a goes to 1.
















Figure 4.3: Sample linear discount factors (n′ = 10).
Exponentially decreasing discount: αi =
1−a
1−an′ a
i−1, where 0 < a < 1 is a parameter
(see also [44]). The weights approach the constant discount factor as a goes to 1.














Figure 4.4: Sample exponential discount factors (n′ = 10).
Average Deviation of the Plans
The deviation of the forecast generated in period j measures the absolute average difference
between the total demand of a forecast and the total realised demand on the same horizon.
This is a more appropriate measure when demand is fulfilled from the inventory and the
demand shifts between periods are almost negligible. In this case, discounting is not
desirable, because it would differentiate between the forward and backward direction of
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4.2.2 Compensation Schemes
In the proposed VMI setting the responsibility of the inventory related decision making is
at the supplier’s side, albeit some important inputs come from the customer. In order to
inspire the customer towards truthful information sharing, she should pay compensation
for the supplier in case of inaccurate forecasts. In this section I present two different
payment schemes based on the imprecision measurements presented earlier in this section.
The choice between these two types of evaluation should be based on the production
and purchase characteristics: if the demand shifts can not cause shortage or necessary
rescheduling, then plan deviation is appropriate, otherwise the forecast error should be
used. Finally, I consider the case of short life-cycle products, where the customer should
also share the run-out related information.
Compensation According to the Error
In this simple case the payment for the period k becomes the price of the called-off com-
ponents plus the compensation for the forecast error:
Pk = c0ξk + c1ek. (4.12)
This payment can be paid immediately after the call-off, since the error can be deter-
mined using the past forecasts.
Proposition 4.3 Using the payment function 4.12, the customer will always share her true
forecast, because if she either increases or decreases the forecasted quantity of a period, she
increases the expected error and thus the payment.
Compensation According to the Average Deviation
In this case a similar payment for the period k is the following:
Pk = c0ξk + c1dk. (4.13)
The complete payment can be fully paid only after n′ periods: the price of the call-off
can be paid immediately, but the amount of the deviation (and thus the compensation)
only turns out at the end of the stability horizon.
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Proposition 4.4 Using payment function 4.13, sharing the true forecast is optimal for
the customer, but it is not unique. Any redistribution of the demand on the horizon is also
optimal until the sum does not change, in special case, the customer can aggregate total
forecast for the next period without any consequence to the payment.
Thus the payment function 4.13 is inappropriate for channel coordination purposes.
However, this problem can be resolved by introducing the idea of rolling compensation.
Let
P̃k,0 = c0ξk (4.14)
and







∣∣∣∣∣ (l = 1, .., n′) (4.15)
be the estimated payments for period k computed in periods k + l (l = 0, .., n′). According
to the definitions Pk = P̃k,n′ . With rolling compensation, the customer should pay P̃k,0 in
period k (i.e., only the price of the components called off) and P̃k,l − P̃k,l−1 in periods k + l
(l = 1, .., n′) for the deviation of forecast generated in period k, respectively. This process
can be interpreted as the partners estimate the expected payment for period k in periods
between k and k + n′, and the customer revises the compensation that she has already
paid. In the end, the total amount paid will be just Pk. Note that P̃k,l − P̃k,l−1 can also
be negative; this means that the customer paid too much compensation in the previous
period and she gets back a part of it. The total payment in a period k using the rolling
coordination method becomes:







Proposition 4.5 With rolling compensation, sharing the true forecast is the unique opti-
mum for the customer, because any redistribution of the forecast means an expected early
compensation, which will be paid back only later, i.e., loaning money without interest.
For instance, if the customer aggregates the total forecast for the first period of the
horizon, she can expect to pay a huge compensation on the next period, which will be
amortised weekly by the supplier. If the payment is not made in every period but in larger
time intervals, the payment function should be modified by including interest.
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Extending Compensation for Short Life-Cycle Products
In the WWr model I considered short life-cycle products by introducing the possibility of
run-out. If one considers this setting, the customer must also share her knowledge about
this probability. I assume that the distribution of run-out (or equivalently, the distribution
of the length of the remaining product life) is a discrete distribution with one parameter
(such as geometric, uniform or Poisson presented in Sect. 3.2.3). I also assume that the
type of distribution is common knowledge, only the parameter is the private information of
the customer.
Run-out mainly causes problem in the situation when the production (or purchasing)
is made in large batches, so obsolete inventories may remain. Therefore the measurement
based on the forecast deviation seems to be appropriate for such cases. I propose a payment
function that has the following properties:
i.) If no run-out happens, the customer pays the compensation for forecast deviation
(payment 4.13), but besides, also pays compensation for the additional uncertainty.
The smaller the communicated probability is, the smaller the compensation.
ii.) If run-out happens, then the customer pays compensation for forecast deviation re-
lated before the run-out. She also pays compensation for uncertainty: the smaller
the communicated probability is, the larger the compensation.
iii.) The expected payment of the customer will be minimal, if she shares the forecast
and probability parameter according to her best knowledge.
The proposed payment function is the following:
Pk =
{
P̃k,n′ − c2 ln(Pr(ηk > n′)) , if no run-out happens,
P̃k,l−1 − c2 ln(Pr(ηk ≤ n′)) , if product runs-out in period l,
(4.17)
where P̃k,l was defined by Eqs. 4.14 – 4.15 and ηk is the period of run-out estimated in
period k. This payment function consists of three parts:
i.) Payment for quantity called-off, which is independent from the decision variables.
ii.) Compensation for forecast deviation, which is independent from the run-out proba-
bility. If no run-out happens, it is exactly the same as before, and in case of run-out
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it is similar, but on a shorter horizon. Therefore the customer has incentives to share
the true forecast to minimise this term of compensation. Note that because run-out
may occur, the redistribution of the demand on the horizon ruins the optimality of
the expected payment.
iii.) The compensation for possibility of run-out is independent from the forecast, de-
pends only on whether run-out actually happens or not. Note that the arguments of
the logarithm functions are between 0 and 1, therefore the compensation terms are
positive.
Proposition 4.6 Using payment function 4.17 the customer should communicate her best
available parameter of the distribution of run-out in case of geometric, uniform or Poisson
distributions.
Proof. I prove the statement in case of Poisson distribution, the geometric and uniform
cases are similar, but pk and Nk should be used instead of λk.
Let us assume that the customer estimates the parameter λk (where the probability
that the product does not run-out in the stability horizon is Prλk(ηk > n
′)), but she
communicates λ′k instead (wherewith the probability is Prλ′k(ηk > n
′)). Then the expected
compensation term will be:
Prλk(ηk > n
′)
(−c2 ln(Prλ′k(ηk > n′)))+ (1 − Prλk(ηk > n′)) (−c2 ln(1 − Prλ′k(ηk > n′))) .
(4.18)
She wants to minimise this term, therefore the derivative must equal to zero:
1 − Prλk(ηk > n′)














Simplifying this equation leads to the condition Prλ′k(ηk > n
′) = Prλk(ηk > n
′). The second
derivative test shows, that this yields a minimum of the expected compensation. In case
of geometric, uniform or Poisson distributions Prλ′k(ηk > n
′) = Prλk(ηk > n
′) is fulfilled
iff their parameters are equal, therefore the customer is inspired to share this parameter
according to her best knowledge. Using this payment function, sharing the true forecast is
optimal for the customer and it is unique. 
Note that in the proof we used the following properties of the distribution:
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i.) The probability distribution has only one parameter and the CDF is continuously
differentiable in the parameter. This guarantees that the expected compensation has
a unique stationary point; furthermore, if the expected payment is convex, then the
stationary point is a global minimum.
ii.) The CDF is an injective function of the distribution parameter. This means that two
different parameters would lead to different probabilities, hence, the customer should
share the real parameter in order to minimise the expected payment.
Thus the proposed compensation scheme is applicable with every distribution having the
above properties.
The proposed compensations in case of geometric, uniform or Poisson distributions can
be found in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Special cases of compensation.
Geometric (pk) Uniform (Nk > n
′) Poisson (λk)
no run-out −c2 ln
(
(1 − pk)n′












1 − (1 − pk)n′










This type of payment can be fully paid only after n′ periods (if no run-out happens):
the price of the call-off can be paid immediately, but the compensation terms only turn
out at the end of the stability horizon. However, the rolling compensation approach can
be used here, too.
Note that if the product runs out, the compensation for possibility of run-out is in-
dependent from the period in which the run-out happens. This may seem odd at first
sight, but remember: a rolling horizon forecasting is considered. When a run-out happens,
there will always be n′ forecast with the run-out in different periods (from 1, .., n′), thus
differentiating the period of run-out would be redundant.
4.3 A Game Theoretic Generalisation
In this section I study a two-player non-cooperative game where the utilities depend on a
stochastic variable whose distribution is known by only one of the players. I formulate this
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situation first as a principal – agent model that I call a forecast sharing game, which is a
generalisation of the special models presented in the previous two sections. I show some
preliminary results for such contracts that can guarantee efficiency. Then I generalise the
model as a mechanism design problem and prove an impossibility theorem that excludes the
fair cost and profit sharing in the general case. Finally, I enumerate some open questions
and future research directions related to this model. General introduction to mechanism
design can be found in [46, 80, 81]. The principal – agent model and the contracting theory
are described in [57, 71, 87, 102].
4.3.1 Forecast Sharing Games in Principal –Agent Setting
Let us consider a market, where the stochastic demand should be entirely fulfilled. If a
single enterprise serves the market, it firstly determines a production plan x ∈ K, then the
demand ξ ∈ D realises. Since the entire demand has to be fulfilled, if x underestimates the
demand, new and costly productions are necessary—usually in overtime, with outsourcing
or with additional setups—while overestimation leads to obsolete inventories. I consider
the utility in the following form:
v(ξ) − c(x, ξ), (4.20)
where v is the income function depending only on the demand and c is the cost function.
I assume that the enterprise creates a demand forecast θ ∈ Θ based on its beliefs about
the market and it also has an appropriate choice function f : Θ → K that can determine
an optimal production plan for a given forecast, i.e.,
f(θ) ∈ argmax
x∈K





Therefore if a θ forecast is given, the utility of the enterprise becomes
u(θ, ξ) = v(ξ) − c(f(θ), ξ), (4.23)
where f(θ) is called the first-best solution.
Let us now consider that the market is served by a chain of a customer and a supplier
applying the VMI business model. This means that the customer forecasts the demand
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Enterprise
Market
Figure 4.5: Centralised setting.
since she is more familiar with the market, while the supplier is responsible for determining
the production plan and for supplying the products. This can be modelled as a princi-
pal – agent problem, where the customer is the agent who has the forecast as a private
information (also called her type). Note that I do not assume that an a priori distribution
about the type is known by the principal, i.e., I regard strict incomplete information.
According to VMI, the agent should share her forecast with the principal, this calls
for a direct-revelation mechanism, i.e., the possible strategy of the customer is to report a
forecast θ̂ ∈ Θ. This can also be interpreted as θ is the “best achievable forecast”, but the
agent may not make effort in forecasting and generates only θ̂. However, the value of the
random variable (the demand) is independent from this effort, thus it is different from the
standard moral hazard problem.
Since θ cannot be observed by the principal, it is not contractible; the agent pays
therefore depending only on θ̂ and ξ. The utility of the agent is the difference between the
valuation of the income and the payment:
v(ξ) − t(θ̂, ξ), (4.24)
while the principal’s profit becomes the difference between the payment and the cost:
t(θ̂, ξ) − c(x, ξ). (4.25)
Let us call the payment function t strongly strategy-proof if
Eθ[t(θ̂, ξ)] > Eθ[t(θ, ξ)] ∀θ̂ ∈ Θ \ { θ }, (4.26)
i.e., the agent with forecast θ can minimise the payment—thus maximise her utility—by
choosing θ̂ = θ. Applying such payment assures that truth-revelation is the only dominant
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strategy of the agent. It is easy to see that if t is strongly strategy-proof then the principal




Figure 4.6: Decentralised setting with commonly known realised demand.
To sum up, the characteristics of the mechanism resulted by a strongly strategy-proof
payment are as follows:
• The truth-revealing is dominant strategy for the agent.
• It is efficient, i.e., it results the first-best.
• It is budget-balanced, i.e., the payment is transferred only between the players.
• From efficiency and budget-balance properties follows the Pareto-optimality, i.e., any
mechanism that results in a higher utility for one of the players, generates lower
utility for the other.
• The mechanism does not guarantee individual rationality, i.e., the expected utilities
of the players can be negative1.
If both the income and cost functions are common knowledge, then the payment
t(θ̂, ξ) = v(ξ) − λ
(
v(ξ) − c(f(θ̂), ξ)
)
(4.27)
with an arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1] is strongly strategy-proof and provides arbitrary cost and profit
allocation between the players, specifically λ = 1
2
results in equal profits for them. If the
1Although a player with negative expected utility may decide not to participate in the game, it is not
always the best alternative. Getting a new customer is always much more expensive than keeping an
existing one, thus allowing temporary negative utility is common in the global competition.
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expected profit of the centralised problem is non-negative, i.e., Eθ[v(ξ) − c(f(θ), ξ)] ≥ 0,
then the mechanism defined by Eq. 4.27 is (interim) individual rational for the players,
i.e., their expected utilities are also non-negative.
Unfortunately, when the cost function is unobservable for the customer, then such a
result does not hold as I will prove in Section 4.3.2. Before this, I present examples of
strongly strategy-proof mechanisms when the cost function is not contractible.
Firstly, let us consider a trivial example, where the forecast is simply the expected value
of the demand. In this case it is easy to see that for example the payment function in the
form
t(θ̂, ξ) = α|θ̂ − ξ| + β(ξ) (4.28)
is strongly strategy-proof, where α > 0 is a constant and β is an arbitrary function.
However, if one refines the model assuming the forecast is given by the expected value and
the standard deviation, finding an appropriate payment is not so straightforward. In the
following, I present a strongly strategy-proof payment which is a generalisation of Theorem
4.2, without assuming any particular distribution.
Theorem 4.7 Let us consider a one-period problem where the forecast is given by an
expected value and a standard deviation, i.e., θ = (m, σ). Then the payment function in
the form of







is strongly strategy-proof, where α > 0 is a constant and β is an arbitrary function.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Practically, β(ξ) can be considered as the payment for the supplied products, while α
is the price of the VMI service. Furthermore, there is a simple intuition behind the term
(m̂ − ξ)2/σ̂ + σ̂: if the customer states that the forecast is fairly precise (i.e., σ is small),
she is ready to pay larger compensation for the difference between the expected and the
realised demand. This could be avoided by signalling higher uncertainty, but then this
increases the second part of the term.
4.3.2 A Mechanism Design Formulation
In this section I consider a more general form of the forecast sharing game with strict
incomplete information. I assume that the cost function c ∈ C = { c : K × D → R+0 }
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is a private information of the supplier. Due to the revelation principle, we can focus on
direct-revelation mechanisms, thus in the form M = (f, t1, t2) where f : Θ×C → K is the
choice function and ti : Θ×C ×D → R are the payment functions (i = 1, 2). The utilities
of the customer and the supplier are
ur(θ, θ̂, ĉ, ξ) = v(ξ) − t1(θ̂, ĉ, ξ) (4.30)
and
us(c, θ̂, ĉ, ξ) = t2(θ̂, ĉ, ξ) − c(f(θ̂, ĉ), ξ) (4.31)
respectively, if their real types are θ and c but they claim θ̂ and ĉ instead.
In this formulation the mechanism can be considered as an independent third party,
whom the players share their information, who decides about the production plan, which
then has to be executed by the supplier. For this service, the mechanism keeps the difference
between t1 and t2, see Fig. 4.7.
Market
Supplier Customer
Figure 4.7: Mechanism design setting.
Definition 4.8 The choice function f is efficient if it maximises social welfare2, i.e.,
f(θ, c) ∈ argmax
x∈K
Eθ[v(ξ) − c(x, ξ)] = argmin
x∈K
Eθ[c(x, ξ)] ∀θ ∈ Θ,∀c ∈ C. (4.32)
Definition 4.9 A mechanism M is (weakly) strategy-proof, if ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ,∀c, ĉ ∈ C:
Eθ[ur(θ, θ, c, ξ)] ≥ Eθ[ur(θ, θ̂, c, ξ)] (4.33)
and
Eθ[us(c, θ, c, ξ)] ≥ Eθ[us(c, θ, ĉ, ξ)], (4.34)
2The sum of the utilities without the payments.
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i.e., truth telling is a dominant strategy for both players. The definition can be modified
for strong strategy-proofness, which assures that truth telling is the only dominant strategy.
Firstly, I show that if a strategy-proof mechanism gives the same output for different
cost functions, then it gives the same payment for the supplier.
Proposition 4.10 If M is a strategy-proof mechanism, c, ĉ ∈ C, θ ∈ Θ such that f(θ, c) =
f(θ, ĉ), then Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)] = Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)].
Proof. Let us assume that Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)] < Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)]. But then
Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)] − Eθ[c(f(θ, c), ξ)] < Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)] − Eθ[c(f(θ, ĉ), ξ)], (4.35)
i.e., the mechanism is not strategy-proof, since the supplier with type c would state that
his type is ĉ. 
I now prove that if we are looking for an efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, then
t2 should be independent from the cost function of the supplier, therefore it excludes the
cost and profit sharing between the players.
Theorem 4.11 Let M be an efficient, weakly strategy-proof mechanism. Then
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀c, ĉ ∈ C : Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)] = Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)]. (4.36)
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the uniqueness of Groves mechanism among effi-
cient and strategy-proof mechanisms, thus I exploit that the cost function can be arbitrary
function.
Let us consider a fixed θ and indirectly assume that ∃c, ĉ ∈ C : Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)] >
Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)] and define
ε = Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)] − Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)] > 0. (4.37)
Due to the modus tollens of Proposition 4.10, f(θ, c) = f(θ, ĉ). Because the cost
function can be arbitrary, ∃c̃ ∈ C,∃k ∈ R :
Eθ[c̃(f(θ, ĉ), ξ)] = k (4.38)
Eθ[c̃(x, ξ)] > k ∀x = f(θ, ĉ) (4.39)
Eθ[c̃(f(θ, c), ξ)] < k + ε (4.40)
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From the efficiency of the mechanism follows that f(θ, c̃) = f(θ, ĉ) and then from
Proposition 4.10, Eθ[t2(θ, c̃, ξ)] = Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)]. But then
Eθ[us(c̃, θ, c̃, ξ)] = Eθ[t2(θ, c̃, ξ)] − Eθ[c̃(f(θ, c̃), ξ)] = Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)] − k (4.41)
and
Eθ[us(c̃, θ, c, ξ)] = Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)]−Eθ[c̃(f(θ, c), ξ)] > Eθ[t2(θ, c, ξ)]−k−ε = Eθ[t2(θ, ĉ, ξ)]−k,
(4.42)
thus the mechanism is not strategy-proof. 
The theorem proves the reasonable conjecture that the supplier can claim higher costs
in such a way, that the optimal production plan does not change, thus he may try to obtain
more payment without increasing his costs.
Although theorem 4.11 is rather negative if we are aimed at fair cost and profit shar-
ing, it has some positive consequences as well. If t1 = t2 is independent from the cost
function, the supplier will chose the efficient outcome without any central decision maker
(Axiom 4.1). The outcome may be even unobservable for the customer, since her utility is
independent from the outcome.
4.3.3 Open Questions and Future Work
Since the VMI business model has became widespread recently, I believe that it is important
to study it and the presented forecast sharing game points towards this direction. Despite
the negative consequences of theorem 4.11, there are several possible solutions to guarantee
individual rationality, some of them are as follows
• In the proof of theorem 4.11, I exploited that the cost function can be arbitrary. If
one considers a certain form of the cost function, maybe even the customer has a
belief about its parameters—which assumption can be conceivable in practice—then
we may get different results.
• In this model I assumed that the entire demand should be fulfilled. One can study
the situation, when lost sales are allowed. In this case theorem 4.11 holds no more.
• If lost sales are allowed, one may also study such mechanisms that are not effective,
only approximating.
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4.4 Practical Considerations
4.4.1 Length of the Stability Horizon
Throughout the section I have assumed that the stability horizon equals to the forecast
horizon, i.e., n′ = n. This assumption is explicable with the fact that if imprecision is
not measured in the end of the planning horizon, the planners do not have incentives to
improve forecast quality in those periods. In the practice however, this restriction would
lead either to an unacceptably long stability horizon or an insufficiently short planning
horizon.
We implemented these measurements in an industrial supply chain information sharing
application (see Sect. 5.1). Depending on the production characteristics of the supplier,
the stability horizon is set to 4-16 weeks, while the planning horizon is generally 36-48
weeks long. As extensive data analysis showed, the deviations in the stability horizon
are relatively small, but usually large on the whole planning horizon. However, the long
planning horizon is necessary: due to seasonality, a part of the high demand of autumn and
winter must be produced in springtime. Without this production smoothing, idle capacities
and capacity shortages would cause serious problems both in the service level and in the
production efficiency. This means that improving planning on the post-stability horizon
implies better precision on the stability horizon, too. All in all, the customer has no
incentives to share the true forecast beyond the stability horizon.
4.4.2 Compensation Parameters
The models presented in this chapter assume that c0 unit price, c1 and c2 compensation
prices are preliminary fixed parameters. In a theoretical situation, when the production
costs and end-market prices were common knowledge, these parameters could be used for
cost and profit sharing between the partners. However, in real supply chains these are also
private information, like the demand forecasts. For a fair allocation of costs and benefits a
complete coordination mechanism resulting in truthful sharing of all private information—
if such exists at all—should be developed, but this problem is beyond the scope of this
dissertation; it is an open issue of contemporary research of supply chain coordination.
As an acceptable practical trade-off, I propose that the negotiation process about pay-
ment parameters between the partners should be supported by a simulation environment
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based on both historical and random data. Such a tool can help estimating the long-term
results of different parameters. Fig. 4.8 shows an example of the payments in each period
where the compensation terms are usually much less than the price paid for components—
as long as no run-out happens. When the product runs-out however, the compensation
increases (cf. Eq. 4.17) to redeem for the obsolete inventory at the supplier.
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500000
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1.5 106 Price for quantity called-off
Compensation for imprecise forecasts









Figure 4.8: Components of the payment.
4.5 Experiments
In this section I analyse the examples of Sect. 3.4 in a decentralised setting. In this case
the profit of the customer is the income for the end-products minus the payment for the
required components minus further production, inventory holding and logistic costs. Since
I do not have not only the necessary parameters, but also the structure of this profit
function for the real cases, I rather focus on the supplier’s profit, which can be modelled
with the payment minus the cost. According to the main results of this chapter, I also
assume that the optimal lot-sizes of the decentralised problems equal to the solutions of
the centralised systems.
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4.5.1 Experiments with the Decentralised Newsvendor Model
I present here the result of the simulations using the parameters from the first row of
Table 3.3, i.e., cs = 55269.5, cp = 3.15 and m = 7152. I used b = 393.30 (which means 10%
relative deviation), c0 = 10 and simulated the arisen costs and payments for different c1
compensation parameters by averaging 1000 simulation runs in each scenario. The results
can be found in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Compensation’s effect on supplier’s profit.
c1 q
∗ p Cd Cu P Z πS
1 8640 71410 1375 1297 74082 83846 -9765
2 8640 71385 2504 2594 76483 83778 -7295
3 8640 71533 3814 3892 79239 83849 -4611
4 8640 71458 6043 5189 82690 83849 -1159
5 8640 72052 7295 6486 85833 84179 1654
6 8640 71544 8416 7783 87743 83723 4019
7 8640 71292 9286 9081 89658 83899 5759
8 8640 71614 10962 10378 92954 83682 9272
9 8640 72102 12017 11675 95794 83674 12120
10 8640 71498 11704 12972 96173 83787 12386
Here q∗ denotes the optimal lot size, which does not change, since the solution of the
newsvendor model is independent from the compensation parameter. The p, Cd and Cu
mean the three parts of the payment function: the price paid for the components, the
compensation for deviation and compensation for forecast uncertainty, respectively. The
price is independent from c1, but fluctuates slightly due to the random demand. The two
parts of compensation evidently increase with c1. The total payment is the sum of the
three parts, denoted by P and can be compared with the total arisen cost (Z). The profit
of the supplier is πS = P − Z.
I also performed ceteris paribus sensitivity analysis of each parameter, i.e., with all
other parameters left fixed. An interesting example of changing the expected demand can
be seen in Table 4.3, where I used the same cs, cp and c0 parameters as in the previous
example and set c1 = 1 and the relative deviation 10%.
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Table 4.3: Expected demand’s effect on supplier’s profit.
m b q∗ p Cd Cu P Z πS
6000 331 7307 59933 982 1088 62003 79017 -17014
7000 386 8464 70189 1339 1270 72797 83467 -10670
8000 441 9613 79927 1516 1451 82894 86972 -4077
9000 496 10755 90087 1646 1632 93366 90630 2736
10000 551 11890 100351 1797 1814 103962 94761 9201
11000 606 13019 110264 2028 1995 114286 97998 16289
12000 662 14143 119937 1999 2177 124113 101424 22689
13000 717 15262 130013 2319 2358 134690 105415 29275
14000 772 16376 140218 2519 2539 145277 110068 35209
15000 827 17486 149878 2839 2721 155438 113415 42023
16000 882 18592 160751 3105 2902 166758 117680 49079
In this case, both the payment and the cost increase with the expected demand, but
due to their different slopes, the larger the demand, the larger the profit of the supplier.
One can notice that Cd ≈ Cu in every simulation. This is not accidental: if m′ = m and
b′ = b, then E[Cd] = Cu. The comparison of costs (narrow bars) and payments (wide bars)
is graphically illustrated in Fig. 4.9.








Figure 4.9: Payment versus cost.
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4.5.2 Experiments with the Rolling Horizon Coordination Model
I illustrate the imaginary payment in Fig. 4.10 for the same component that was presented
in Fig. 3.15. I applied the same parameters as in Sect. 3.4 plus the following ones: n′ = 4,
c0 = 100, c1 = 2 and c2 = 10000.






Figure 4.10: Example payments based on real forecast and consumption data.
In this case, the simulation approach can also be used to compare the cost and the
payment of the supplier facing stochastic demand. Table 4.4 contains the results of the
same simulation as in Table 3.4, but this time I included the payment—in total and in
parts—to be able to estimate the profit of the supplier.
Simulation can also illustrate how the costs and payments change when the customer
shares inappropriate estimations for the run-out probability. Table 4.5 presents the results
of the experiments with the 1153 materials introduced in Sect. 3.4.
I generated the forecasts assuming geometric run-out distribution with p = 0.02. As
we have already seen in the last chapter, communicating the parameter increased or de-
creased by 0.01 results in approximately 2% larger costs for the supplier. But due to the
compensation, the payment also increases; in this case almost with 4%. The effect of the
parameter distortion to the supplier’s profit depends on other parameters as well, thus it
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Table 4.4: Summary of 1000 simulation runs.
Statistics AVG STD MAX MIN
Cost 114579.04 1301.70 118793.79 110262.21
Total payment 303129.42 31910.67 403088.70 195304.70
Payment for call-offs 282825.2 31910.46 382800 175000
Compensation for deviation 101.52 18.49 180 56
Compensation for possible run-out 20202.70 0 20202.70 20202.70
Table 4.5: The effect of the parameter estimation.
p′ = 0.01 p′ = 0.03
Cost 102.1% 102.27%
Total payment 103.93% 103.85%
Profit of the supplier 105.51% 108.94%
might increase—as in this example—or decrease, while customer always loses on being not
truthful.
The same data source and parameters was used to study the effects of the inappropri-
ate forecasting, but in this case, the forecasted demand was manipulated instead of the
run-out parameter. Fig. 4.6 shows the relative differences when the demand is systemat-
ically over/underestimated by 5/10%. While the costs and payments both increase with
the imprecision, the profit of the customer—as in the previous experiment—behave un-
predictable. These two empirical studies confirm the proven property: the customer can
expect to pay more when the shared information is not appropriate.
Table 4.6: The effect of the forecast quality.
−10% −5% +5% +10%
Cost 102.66% 101.601% 101.226% 101.274%
Total payment 104.08% 103.272% 103.535% 103.537%
Profit of the supplier 102.3% 100.503% 105.484% 102.293%
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter I studied the two previously presented models in a decentralised setting
with two autonomous, rational enterprises along a supply chain with asymmetric infor-
mation. In order to achieve the optimal centralised solution, I proposed that the supplier
should provide a service of managing the channel inventory (the practically widespread
VMI approach) and the customer should pay also for this service. I presented the appro-
priate payment functions for achieving channel coordination, and finally, I illustrated their
properties with some simulation results.
Although the newsvendor model is widespread in the channel coordination literature,
my approach differs in several aspects from the existing results. I consider asymmetric
information, quantitative demand forecast, VMI, 100% service level requirement and I
presented a protocol with compensational payment that coordinates the channel. Hence,
my formulation and solution for this special case is a novel research result.
As I already mentioned in the literature review, the channel coordination problem on a
longer horizon, considering rolling horizon planning is neglected in the literature; therefore
my results study a new direction of the channel coordination. The presented approach is
based on the similar idea of compensation that I applied in the newsvendor case, but it is
able to consider practical planning problems better than the one-period models.
In addition, I started to generalise the problem using the apparatus of the mechanism
design theory. I presented some preliminary results and mentioned some interesting future
research direction in this field.
Chapter 5
Applications in Supply Chain
Planning
This last chapter briefly overviews two implemented systems aimed at increasing sup-
ply chain performance. The first one is a complex information sharing and monitoring
platform deployed at the focal manufacturer participating in our research project. The
system contains different performance measurements including the error and the deviation
of the forecasts, presented in Section 4.2.1. The other application is a pilot simulation
environment for analysing the behaviour of a VMI supply relation. The system applies a
combination of the two lot-sizing models presented in Chapter 3, and evaluates the perfor-
mance and the payment considering the rolling horizon coordination contract. The data
interface of the simulation can work either with the database of the previously mentioned
information sharing platform, or with a specialised random forecast generator.
5.1 Designing an Information Sharing Platform
In this section, I present a real-life development case study of a distributed planning system.
Since this work was done in a team, I use first person plural instead of singular here.
5.1.1 Problem Statement
Our work in the production network presented in Section 1.3 was aimed in general at the
improvement of the overall logistic and production performance, but at the beginning the
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actual details of the means to this end were unclear even for the industrial partners. We
started the work by creating a specialised network model based on a multiagent organisa-
tional reference model [33]. In particular, we identified, analysed and described every plan-
ning role in each enterprise of the network—including the used decision support systems,
algorithms, human heuristics, planning granularity, cycle times, etc.—, the interaction pro-
tocols between enterprises as well as the existing information resources. As a result, we
could point out several issues that were critical to some key performance indicators (KPI),
and also some special circumstances, which could be exploited in the algorithms proposed
in Chapter 3. Some important characteristics of the suppliers are as follows:
Setup. Some suppliers have huge setup costs, therefore they produce in large batches
based on medium-term forecasts. Others have negligible setups, thus—whenever
lead-times allow—they produce only to order.
Capacity constraint. For some components, the production time is very small, therefore
they can be produced in arbitrary large batches—as long as there is enough raw
material. Hence, there is practically no capacity constraint. In other cases such
constraints should be considered.
Raw material. For almost every supplier there are some raw materials that can be
procured with long lead-time (months), therefore their supply should be based on
medium-term forecasts.
Customisation. The components can be either standardised or customised. The demand
for the former ones can be considered stable, but in the latter case, run-out can occur
and sometimes obsolete inventories remain.
Supply lead-time. The production of the components usually takes five days—as long
as raw material is available—, while the transportation time is one day—due to the
regional type of the network. Therefore the supply lead-time—the possible minimal
time between component order and consumption—is considered to be one week.
In our case, we could classify suppliers into two groups: (i) the suppliers of standard
components work with small setup times and costs, but strict capacity constraints applying
make-to-order approach, while (ii) the suppliers of mostly customised packaging materials
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have high setup costs, produce to stock based on medium-term forecasts, but the produc-
tion capacities are large enough to consider them infinite. In the latter case the relatively
high risk of producing obsolete inventories may involve huge financial losses, hence we
decided to concentrate on this problem that offered the best possibility to decrease ineffi-
ciency. For this purpose I developed the algorithms presented in Chapter 3 and proposed
the channel coordination approach of Chapter 4. Note that although we concentrated on
packaging material suppliers, the precision and stability of the medium-term forecasts are
important also for other suppliers so as to manage their long lead-time procurements.
5.1.2 System Design
Based on the detailed network model, we concluded that information transparency is es-
sential in order to provide basis for the MTS production and for the procurement at the
suppliers. In accordance with the industrial partners, we decided to develop an information
sharing system called Logistics Platform (LP) and prepare it to support the VMI approach
and JIT deliveries, too. Therefore the designed system covers two planning levels: medium
and short term.
On medium term the goal is to achieve more efficient component production and raw
material purchase, thus the customer enterprise should share her component forecasts de-
rived from his production plan. On the short term, however, the supply service level and
the cost efficient delivery are the main objectives. For this reason, the short-term com-
ponent consumption plan derived from the customer’s production schedule, the inventory
levels and the suppliers’ transportation schedule ought to be shared in the system. The
production schedule of the customer and its dependent daily material demand in our case
were generated by a custom-tailored scheduler system that was developed in the same
project [26].
Since the studied network was focal, the system could be deployed at the customer. This
way, it can easily access the required information from other systems, and in addition, it can
use the existing corporate security and single sign-on (SSO) authentication technologies
applied by the customer. The users of every enterprise can access only the permitted
information via a controlled web interface. The architecture of the system can be seen in
Fig. 5.1.
Beyond information sharing, the platform has two further functions. On one hand, it
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of the information sharing platform.
monitors the supply process by comparing planned component consumption and expected
delivery, i.e., helps detecting and avoiding possible future shortages. On the other hand, it
evaluates past performance in terms of the forecast imprecision presented in Section 4.2.1
as well as the service level of the suppliers. Note that decision making function is not
included in the system.
The LP is in a daily use for more than a year now, and it is constantly improved based
on the experiences and new requirements of its users. Currently, more than 40 plants—1
focal customer, 5 internal and several external suppliers—, more than 60 users and 10000
different components are defined in the system.
Automated information sharing between enterprises along supply chains is sorely needed
for coordinating supply with demand and even for enhancing efficiency by cooperation. As
it turned out, using the LP also helped human experts detecting serious glitches and in-
consistencies in the existing planning processes and data administration. For some further
details and lessons of the usage I refer to publications [28, 110].
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Figure 5.2: Forecast evaluation in the LP.
5.2 Simulation Environment
For testing the algorithms and protocols, I developed a simulation system called Inven-
toSim, whose architecture can be seen in Fig. 5.3. The programme was written in Mathe-
matica 5.2, however, the WWr algorithm was implemented in Java and called through the
JLink API. As the figure shows, it can operate in two modes: it either reads real forecasts
from the database of the LP, or uses a random number generator for this purpose. While
the former method is useful for evaluating the algorithms with real problem instances,
the latter facilitates carrying out systematic tests and gives more insights to the average
performance.
5.2. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 100
Inv entoSim
Lot sizing













Figure 5.3: Architecture of the simulator.
5.2.1 Parameters
On the user interface several parameters can be set (the parameters denoted with * can
be set automatically or are not necessary when working from the LP database):
• Horizon related data.
Horizon∗. The number of generated forecast in a rolling horizon manner.
Forecast horizon∗. Length of the forecasts (n).
Stability horizon. Length of the measurement time window (n′).
• Cost parameters.
Setup cost. The cs parameter of the lot-sizing models.
Production cost. The cp parameter of the lot-sizing models.
Inventory holding cost. The h parameter of the lot-sizing models.
Shortage cost. Although in the models the shortages are excluded, practically they
can happen, therefore I introduced a penalty for them, proportional to the
absent quantity.
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• Price parameters.
Unit price. The c0 parameter of the coordination models.
Compensation for deviation. The c1 parameter of the coordination models.
Compensation for possible run-out. The c2 parameter of the coordination mod-
els.
• Demand parameters.
Average demand∗. Used for forecast generation (see below).
Relative deviation∗. Used for forecast generation.
Shift probability∗. Used for forecast generation.
Run-out distribution. Used both for forecast generation and in the WWr algo-
rithm. It can be either geometric, uniform or Poisson distribution (see Sect. 3.2.3).
Real run-out parameter∗. Used for forecast generation.
Estimated run-out parameter. Used in the WWr algorithm. It can differ from
the real run-out parameter, thus the effect of an inappropriate estimation can
be analysed with simulations.
Shortage effect. When shortage occurs, the absent quantity can be either (i) back-
logged and satisfied later, (ii) lost or (iii) lost with the whole order cancelled,
i.e., the order can be fulfilled only completely or not at all.
• Miscellaneous parameters.
Initial inventory∗. The forecast will be decreased with the available quantity.
Safety stock policy. The simple policies presented in Sect. 3.3.3 can be chosen.
Safety stock parameter. The parameter of the previous policy.
Number of simulation runs∗. The simulations can be run several times with the
same parameters for statistical evaluation.
Note that the LP does not contain any information about prices or costs of production,
most of these data are known approximately, though. Another difficulty is that the system
does not register whether a component runs out or not. The run-out components have
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constant zero forecasts, but this does not mean necessarily a run-out: temporary long
pauses in the demand can also happen.
5.2.2 Random Rolling Horizon Forecast Generation
Demand forecast is a fundamental input for most inventory and production planning meth-
ods. Forecast is usually generated for a given horizon of the future and as the time goes
by and new information becomes available, the forecast is repetitively updated. This phe-
nomenon is expressed in the second law of forecasting: “forecasts always change” [45].
The most widespread quantitative methods of forecasting are the time series models
(e.g., moving average, exponential smoothing, etc.) which predict the future demand based
on the past demand values. In practice however, these quantitative forecasts are always
revised by human experts based on market information.
Thus for modelling an existing forecasting process, applying time series model is in-
appropriate, for it completely disregards the changes caused by qualitative methods [43].
In several situations the Martingale Model of Forecast Evolution (MMFE) is considered
instead, that will be further studied hereinafter.
It is important emphasising that MMFE is not a forecasting method. It can be used in
stochastic inventory and production planning models ([39, 106]) and in simulations ([48]).
For a short review of models applying MMFE, I refer to [13]. The basic definitions related
to martingales can be found e.g., in [40].
The Standard MMFE Model
The first use of MMFE was presented in [38], which considered the forecast evolution of a
single-item with uncorrelated demand. The model was generalised for the multi-product
case by Heath and Jackson in [43], where the correlation across products and time periods
were considered and where the model was named as MMFE. For the sake of simplicity,
I overview only the single-item version of the model below, that I use as a basic in my
forecast generation.
Let Ft,t+i denote the forecast made in period t for demand in period t+i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where n is the length of the forecast horizon. It is assumed that beyond the horizon, the
forecast is implicitly given by a long-run average1 d: Ft,t+i = d, i > n. It is also assumed
1The model can be modified considering varying dt+i for modelling life-cycle phases (e.g., ramp-up),
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that the realised demand in period t is known in that period and it is denoted by Ft,t. Past
“forecast” are considered to be known: Ft,t−i = Ft−i,t−i, i ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Let us define the forecast update2 εt,t+i = Ft,t+i −Ft−1,t+i and the forecast update vector
εt = (εt,t, . . . , εt,t+n). The MMFE model has four assumptions:
A1 If we consider Ft = (Ft,t, Ft,t+1, . . . ) then it is assumed that F0, . . . , Ft are known in
period t. Let us define Ft = σ(F0, . . . , Ft) as the smallest σ-field with respect to
which F0, . . . , Ft are each measurable, then the sequence {Ft} is a filtration. This
assumption simply states that the knowledge growths with time.
A2 It is assumed that {(Ft,τ ,Ft), t ≥ 0} is a martingale ∀τ ≥ 0, i.e., E[Ft+1,τ | Ft] = Ft,τ .
This assumption states that if we are in period t, then the expected value of the
demand in the period t + i is Ft,t+i. From this assumption E[εt,t+i] = 0 follows.
A3 The εt vectors are independent and identically distributed (they form a static stochas-
tic process).
A4 The distribution of the εt vector is multivariate normal (with mean 0 from A2).
It follows from the assumptions that the model can be described with two parameters:
the initial F0 state and the Σ covariance matrix of the normal distribution, which can be
determined from past forecasts and demand data.
A weakness of the additive model pointed out by the authors is that the variance of the
forecast update is independent from the forecasts. They found however that the deviations
of the forecasts are usually proportional to the sizes of the forecasts, thus they introduced
the multiplicative model which can grasp this property, but still fits in the model described
with martingales.
In the following I show and analyse two further phenomena of the forecast generation
which cannot be expressed in the original MMFE.
Products with Uncertain Life-Cycle
An important characteristic of the today’s markets is that the demand for customised
products (or components) can suddenly cease. This means that if the product runs out in
although this possibility was disregarded in the previous papers.
2In fact, this is the additive model. For the multiplicative model I refer to [43].
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period τ , then Fτ,τ = Fτ+1,τ+1 = · · · = 0. This phenomenon cannot be described with the
above defined MMFE, thus it is necessary to study this situation and extend the model.
Let rt denote the event of the run-out, i.e., rt = 0 if the product did not run out
until period t, and 1 otherwise. Furthermore, let pt,t+i < 1 denote the estimation of the
probability that the product will run out exactly in period t + i, i > 0, made in period t. I
assume that for all t: rt +
∑∞
i=1 pt,t+i = 1 and I define pt = (pt,t+1, pt,t+2, . . . ). Let us define
the probability that the product runs out in the next i periods: ct,t+i =
∑t+i
τ=t+1 pt,τ .
Take as filtration the sequence Ft = σ(F0, . . . , Ft, r0, . . . , rt, p0, . . . , pt). I assume that
E[rt+i | Ft] = rt + ct,t+i (i > 0), (5.1)
thus {(rt,Ft), t ≥ 0} is a submartingale.
It is a basic question how should we define the Ft,t+i forecast in this setting. I suppose
the following interpretation: as far as there is no run-out, the expected demand in period
t + i is Ft,t+i, otherwise it is 0. More precisely let us assume that E[Ft+1,τ | Ft, rt+1 = r] =
(1 − r)Ft,τ . Using Eq. 5.1: E[Ft+1,τ | Ft] = (1 − rt − pt,t+1)Ft,τ , i.e., {(Ft,τ ,Ft), t ≥ 0} is a
supermartingale for all τ ≥ 0.
This contradicts with the second assumption of MMFE, whose authors argue that “if
the second assumption is not satisfied it will be possible to construct improved predictions
(in the mean squared error sense)”. Although it is true, I still stick to the presented
interpretation, due to the following reason: the probability of the run-out is usually small3,
E[rt+i | Ft] ≈ rt, and the most probable value of Ft+i,t+i in period t is usually Ft,t+i. In
probability theory this value (or set of values) is called the mode, i.e., where the probability
function attains its maximum.
For an illustration, let us consider the following simple example. Let ξ be a random
variable with the following distribution: Pr(ξ = 0) = 1/2, Pr(ξ = 1) = Pr(ξ = 2) = Pr(ξ =
3) = 1/6. In this case E[ξ] = 1, but its mode is 0. Which would be the more rational
forecast for ξ?
Demand Shifts
The multiplicative MMFE can characterise the phenomenon when the forecast change of
a period depends on the forecasted quantity, i.e., Ft,t+i = (1 + εt,t+i)Ft−1,t+i. I have found
3If the probability is high, it is better to use one-period models instead of the rolling horizon ones, see
Section 3.
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however that the change also depends on the neighbouring quantities: the planners tend
to hasten urgent task, postpone less important ones or simply redistribute tasks to fill the
capacities4. This kind of demand shifts highly affects the size of the optimal safety stocks,
and although the main goal of Heath and Jackson was to determine safety stock levels by
simulation, they disregarded this kind of variations.
I consider the following model of demand shifts: let the random variable st,t+i ∈
{−1, 0, 1} denote the direction of the demand shift of period t + i in period t (left, none
and right, respectively). The proportion of the shifted demand is the random variable
rt,t+i ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the new forecast is the previous forecast, minus the shifted out quan-
tity, plus the shifted in quantity:









where I assumed that st,t+i = 0 if i > n or i < 0, furthermore st,t ≥ 0 and st,t+n ≤ 0. This
means that shifts can occur only in the horizon.
It is clear that in general the martingale assumption does not hold again. The forecast
could be modified to satisfy the assumption, but I argue that this would again distort the
representation of the process. However, the following equality still holds for the cumulative
forecast: E[
∑n
i=0 Ft,t+i | Ft] =
∑n
i=0 Ft−1,t+i, since the demand shift only redistributes the
demand on the horizon, but does not affect the total quantity.
Summary
The MMFE or its extensions can be used for various purposes, like in production/inventory
planning models and simulations for determining the optimal/acceptable base-stock level,
planning horizon, safety stock; comparing different rolling-horizon MRP techniques; esti-
mating stockouts, costs, etc. My simulation system includes a combined forecast generator:
MMFE with demand shifts and run-outs and used the simulation not only for the above
enumerated purposes, but also for estimating the cost-and-profit-sharing in a VMI situa-
tion.
4Some medium-horizon master planners cannot optimise for filling the capacities, thus it is adjusted
later manually.
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The random forecast generator module determines the component forecast on a rolling
horizon. The first forecast contains uniformly distributed demand on the planning horizon
between zero and twice of the average demand. The other forecasts and the realised
demands are computed from the previous ones with basically the following procedure.
Firstly, the forecast is rolled, i.e., the first period is left out, while a new random forecast
is added to the end of the horizon. Then a normally distributed random noise is added to
the demand with zero expected value and increasing standard deviation along the horizon.
Thirdly, certain quantities can be shifted back and forth between the periods—this captures
the phenomenon when the planners urge or postpone certain works. Finally, the possible
negative forecasts are eliminated and the quantities are rounded to the nearest integer
number.
The specific properties of the implemented forecast generation and some lessons from
the simulation runs are the following:
• The Σ covariance matrix of the MMFE is diagonal (i.e., the forecast updates are
independent across time periods). I also relaxed the normality assumption: while
the εt,t, . . . , εt,t+n−1 are still considered to have normal distribution with 0 mean and
increasing variance, the εt,t+n has uniform distribution on [−d, d] instead. The vari-
ance is linearly increasing, but I am planning to allow also logarithmically increasing
in the future.
• The distribution of run-out can be geometric, uniform or Poisson with arbitrary
parameters. The distribution is considered to be static, which does not seem to be
reasonable (except from the geometric distribution case due to its “lack of memory”
property), thus I intend to change this in the next version of the simulation system.
• For the demand shift model Pr(st,t+i = −1) = Pr(st,t+i = 1) (except for i = 0
and i = n) is an arbitrary constant which is independent both from t and i. I
plan to modify it to be inversely proportional to i, which would be a more realistic
assumption.
• The proportion of the shifted demand is assumed to be uniform (on [0, 1]).
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5.2.3 Lot-Sizing Logic
The lot-sizing module of the supplier operates according to the approach presented in
Fig. 3.11: it basically uses the WWr method, but when it results in one aggregated lot,
then it switches to the newsvendor model. The pseudo-code of one simulation run is as
follows:
variable inventory ← initialInventory
variable wip ← 0  Work-in-progress
for i ← 1 to lenght of horizon +1 do
inventory ← inventory + wip − ξi  Updating inventory level




0 in case of partial lost sales
inventory + ξi in case of full lost sales
inventory in case of backorders
end if
if run − out then









Fi,k − inventory then  Producing in one lot




Finally, the statistical evaluation module computes the most important aspects of the
simulation in terms of average, standard deviation, minimal and maximal observed value
of the simulation runs.
This simulation system is useful not only for validating my algorithms, but also for de-
cision support purposes. Industrial planners could use it for estimating the performance of
the system with certain parameters, e.g., determining whether a particular safety stock pol-
icy is appropriate in order to achieve some service level goal; or studying the consequences
of applying the proposed channel coordination protocols. Furthermore, the simulation re-
sults could be used for calculating the internal rate of return (IRR) or return on investment
(ROI) indicators when deciding whether to switch to a VMI business model.
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Figure 5.4: A collage of the InventoSim user interface.
Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusion
This dissertation investigated the recent trends and issues in cooperative production net-
works, and tried to answer the challenges in some special, practically relevant cases. In
the introductory chapters, I reviewed the current situation in manufacturing of mass cus-
tomised products, described an industrial case study that gave a specific motivation to my
work, and presented the three main research topics related to this dissertation, based on
several recent scientific publications.
In Chapter 3, I presented novel extensions of two classical lot-sizing models considering
the recent market trends, such as the short product life-cycles and the increasing customer
expectations towards high service levels. My first model in this chapter solves the one-
period newsvendor problem aiming at satisfying the demand with minimal cost, even if it
necessitates setting up an additional production. My second model extends the dynamic
Wagner – Whitin problem with a stochastic variable describing the length of the product
life-cycle.
In Chapter 4, I studied the two previously presented models in a decentralised setting.
The goal in these cases is to achieve the optimal centralised performance with two au-
tonomous enterprises along a supply chain with asymmetric information. For this purpose,
I presented supply protocols for both models based on the VMI approach and such pay-
ment functions that achieve channel coordination, i.e., provide optimal channel behaviour
assuming rational enterprises.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I presented two software systems that partially use the models I
had developed: an industrial information sharing system and a pilot simulation environ-
ment supporting decision making.
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The results of this dissertation consider the problems of a special configuration and
neither address nor answer every general issues in production networks. There are several
open questions in this intensively studied field; I enumerate some of them as possible
directions in my future work.
• Firstly, the simplifying assumptions of the centralised model should be omitted,
and the resulting complex problem with multiple items, capacity constraints and
sequence-dependent setups may by studied.
• Secondly, the channel coordination models can be further analysed by exploring the
possibilities of fair cost and profit allocation between the partners. The coordination
can be studied also in make-to-order or engineer-to-order manufacturing environ-
ments (e.g., machine and ship building industries) applying robust local production
planning methods.
• Finally, the simulation system may be extended to the network level with several
supplier tiers in order to analyse the ramification of the events—e.g., machine break-
downs, shortages, urgent orders—in complex adaptive networks and their effects to
the overall network behaviour.
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[108] Ülkü, S., Toktay, L. B., Yücesan, E.: Risk Ownership in Contract Manufacturing.
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 9(3), pp. 225-241, 2007.
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